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The Enacted Purposes Canon
Kevin M. Stack*
ABSTRACT: This Article argues that the principle relied upon in King v.
Burwell that courts "cannot interpret statutes to negate their stated
purposes"-the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a
bedrock element of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has relied
upon this principle for decades, but it has done so in ways that do not call
attention to this interpretive choice. As a result, the scope and patterns of the
Court's reliance are easy to miss. After reconstructing the Court's practice, this
Article defends this principle of interpretation on analytic, normative, and
pragmatic grounds. Building on jurisprudence showing that when a rule
states its own justification the meaning of the rule changes, this Article argues
that enacted purposes change the range of permissible readings of a statute.
The Article also argues that the enacted purposes canon has beneficial
consequences because it requires courts to prioritize the most public-regarding
elements of legislation. The canon, moreover, represents a point of agreement
between textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation.
Based on the Court's long reliance and positive justification, it is time to
acknowledge the enacted purposes canon.
Recognition of the enacted purposes canon matters to administrative law and
legislation. The enacted purposes canon applies in review of administrative
agency action to prevent agencies from adopting interpretations inconsistent
with their statutes' enacted purposes-an implication with particular
importance when the president's policies are in tension with some of the
enacted purposes in legislation. This analysis also exposes how conventional
guidance on legislative drafting misses the critical feature of enacted purpose
provisions: the way they entrench policy. Finally, and most importantly,
attention to enacted purposes erves as a reminder that our federal legislation
is a messy accumulation of individual statutes, with their own purposes, not
aformal code.
* Lee S. c Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to
Richard Bierschbach, Tara Grove, Anita Krishnakumar, Margaret Lemos, Dan Meagher, Nina
Mendelson, Max Minzner, Alex Reinert, Ganesh Sitaraman, as well as to workshop participants
at St. John's Law School and Deakin University Law School, Australia, for comments on early
versions of this paper. In addition, I benefited from excellent research assistance from Erin
Fredrick Conklin, Calvin Cohen, Walter Perry, and Mark Williams.
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THE ENACTED PURPOSES CANON
I. INTRODUCTION
"We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated
purposes." The Supreme Court relied on this principle in King v. Burwell'
after a careful recitation of the Affordable Care Act's ("ACA('s)") enacted
aims and policies.3 This Article's core argument is that this principle-which
I call the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a bedrock
principle of statutory interpretation.
Many federal statutes include an enacted statement of the statute's
purpose. These enacted purposes are part of the enacted text of the statute
-they follow the statute's enacting clause,4 often at the beginning of the
statute under a separate heading or combined with findings or statements of
policy. Like statutory definitions, enacted purposes purport to speak to the
entire statute.
For decades, the Supreme Court has relied upon enacted purposes in
statutory interpretation but has done so without calling attention to its
practice as an interpretive choice.5 As a result, each instance is easy to miss,
and the overall patterns of reliance are even harder to see. Reconstructing the
Court's practice reveals that it has long relied on enacted purposes to exclude
interpretations inconsistent with those purposes. In a sense, there already is
an enacted purposes canon; the Court just has not expressly identified it as
such. Moreover, the enacted purposes principle has strong justifications. At
the most basic level, the enactment of a statement of purpose changes the
range of permitted meanings of a statute; as part of the enacted text, these
provisions exclude interpretations inconsistent with them, just as the
adoption of a rationale for a rule excludes applications of the rule
inconsistent with that rationale. Because Congress generally adopts broad
purposes provisions even when it accommodates special interests in other
parts of the legislation, interpreting statutes in light of their enacted purposes
excludes some private-regarding interpretations in favor of more public-
regarding constructions. In addition, the canon has the pragmatic virtue of
being a point of common ground between textualist and purposivist
approaches to statutory interpretation. On the one hand, it satisfies
textualism's core commitment to privileging the enacted text.6 These
1. King v. Burwell, 135S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015) (quoting N.Y. State Dep'tof Soc. Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973)).
2. Id. at 2493.
3. See id. at 2486-87; see also infra text accompanying notes 115-3 1 and i 38-42 (discussing
King's reliance on enacted aims and policies).
4. 1 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("The enacting clause of all Acts of Congress shall be in the
following form: 'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled.'").
5. See infta Part I.
6. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists FromPuposivists?, io6 COLUM. L. REv. 70, 75
(2oo6) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides?] (noting that textualists seek to understand how a
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purposes are part of the statutory text. On the other hand, it reflects the core
commitment of purposivism that the specific provisions of statutes be
interpreted in light of their more general purposes.7 It insists that general
purposes constrain more specific provisions. This overlap is not just
theoretical: The principle has been relied upon by jurists with very different
perspectives on statutory interpretation'-suggesting its prospects for
emerging as a consensus plank on a closely divided Supreme Court. Based
both on the Court's pattern of reliance and these justifications, this principle
warrants recognition as its own canon of interpretation.
The enacted purposes canon, once made explicit, has implications for
judicial review of agency action as well as for statutory drafting and our
statutory culture. When a court reviews an agency's action, this principle
operates to exclude agency interpretations of statutes that are inconsistent
with the statute's enacted purposes-a particularly important constraint when
the president's policies are in tension with many existing regulatory statutes'
purposes. Uncovering this bedrock principle of statutory interpretation also
shows what conventional advice on legislative drafting gets wrong: Enacted
purpose provisions can be powerful tools for entrenching a policy. More
generally, express recognition of this canon reorients statutory practice. By
requiring a focus on the purpose provision of individual public laws, the
enacted purposes canon serves as a potent reminder that statutory
interpretation must remain focused on construing individual statutes, as
messy and diverse as they are, not making inferences from a legislative code.
Leading treatises on statutory interpretation touch on enacted purposes,
but do not isolate an enacted purposes canon. Justice Scalia and Bryan
Garner's compilation of statutory interpretation canons mentions a
"prefatory-materials canon," under which "[a] preamble, purpose clause, or
recital is a permissible indicator of meaning."9 The enacted purpose canon
differs from this prefatory-materials canon in important respects. The
prefatory-materials canon treats enacted purpose provisions no differently
than unenacted preambles, bearing only on the choice of among permissible
interpretations.,o In contrast, the enacted purposes canon is triggered only by
enacted purposes, and relatedly, treats enacted purposes as part of what
determines what the statute permits, not merely bearing on the choice among
skilled, reasonable user of the words would understand their meaning in context as opposed to
trying to discern actual legislative intent).
7. HENRY M. HART,JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (urging statutory interpreters to determine statutory purpose
and interpret the words of the statute to carry out that purpose).
8. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 109-14 and 143-46.
9. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING lAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTs 63 (2012) (endorsing the principle that "[a] textually permissible interpretation that
furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored").
1o. See id. at 2 19 (noting that "[l]ike other indications of purpose, prefatory text can suggest
only which permissible meanings of the enactment should be preferred").
[VOI. 105:283286
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permissible readings. William Eskridge's treatise on interpretation endorses a
"purposes canon,"" explaining that "[b]ecause purpose clauses are enacted
into law as part of the statute and because they provide authoritative context
for reading the entire statue, my view is that judges should consider them, to
guide judicial discussions of statutory purpose."1 Eskridge notes a few
decisions in which the Supreme Court has relied on enacted purposes,, but
does not explore the scope of the Court's reliance. Sutherland's treatise on
statutory interpretation does not single out enacted purposes or identify a
similar canon.4 Enacted purposes also receive only brief, if any, mention in
contemporary teaching materials on statutory interpretation.'a
In academic literature, the idea that enacted purposes should play a
greater role in statutory purposes has been circulating for several decades,
with various formulations and justifications. Attention to enacted statements
of purpose, as discussed in more detail below, is an important element of
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's method of statutory interpretation set forth in
The Legal Process.,6 Statutory enacted purpose provisions play a role in Susan
Rose-Ackerman's 1992 book, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda, which featured
an inconsistency principle under which courts should not "enforce statutory
provisions that are inconsistent with legislative preambles and policy
statements."'7 David Driesen argues that enacted statements of purpose are
more likely to reflect both the legislators' judgments about sound value and
the public's own values than specific provisions in statutes.'8 Based on
11. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAw: A PRIMER ON How TO READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 105-06 (2016).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1o6-07 (noting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471 (iggg); id. at
494-95 (Gisburg,J., concurring)).
14. See zA NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §i 47:1, 47:4,47:6 (7 th ed. 2oo6, Nov. 2018 update) (providing brief discussion
of preambles and purview materials, largely with reference to state legislative materials).
15. See, e.g., LISA S. BRESSMAN, EDwARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE
167 (2d ed. 2013) (mentioning statements of purpose); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. ETAL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 676 (5th ed. 2014) (mentioning that the enacted statements of purpose "are useful in
conveying the overall policy" of the statute); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES,
REGULATION AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES 466 (2014f) (mentioning purpose clauses); CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (201 1) (providing no discussion of purpose clauses); ABNERJ. MIKVA & ERIC
LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 107-08 (2d ed. 2002) (providing a brief and cautionary statement
on the use of "enacted purpose" statements).
i6. HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 1378; see infra discussion accompanying notes 79-87. In
other writing, I use Hart and Sacks's theory to argue that regulations should be interpreted in
light of their statements of basis and purposes, which I suggest are analogous to enacted
statements of purpose for legislation. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, i1 1 MICH. L.
REV. 355, 391-96 (2012) [hereinafter Stack, Interpreting Regulations].
17. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING TILE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 44 (1992).
18. David Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 125 (2013)-
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arguments about the democratic pedigree of statutory purposes when a
statute includes explicit statements of purpose, Driesen maintains that those
statements should be treated "as a complete catalogue of the statute's goals."'9
At least for the purposes of review of the constitutionality of legislation, Daniel
Crane argues the courts should rely on Congress's enacted, not unenacted
findings.2o And most recently, Jarrod Shobe argues "a statute's findings and
purposes can serve as guideposts to understanding ... the rest of the text"2'
because they are more likely to reflect congressional intent and represent part
of the legislative bargain.22 This Article aims to build on this prior work and
make the case for the enacted purpose canon-by both reconstructing the
Court's past reliance on enacted purposes and refining the justification for
the such a canon.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II describes enacted purpose
provisions, contrasts them with preambles, and discusses their frequency.
Parts III and IV are the heart of the Article. Part III documents the
development ofjudicial reliance on enacted statements of purpose from early
English practice through the Supreme Court's decision in King v. BurwelL3
Part IV defends this judicial reliance on enacted purposes. Building on
jurisprudence showing that a rule's meaning changes when it states its own
justification,24 this Article makes the analytic case that the enactment of
purpose changes the range of permitted meanings of a statute. It then offers
a normative justification of the canon on the ground that, in practice, it will
exclude some private-regarding interpretations of legislation. Finally, it
illustrates the ways in which the enacted purposes canon builds on the
premises of both textualism and purposivism, giving the canon a pragmatic
virtue.
Part V argues that the enacted purpose principle warrants recognition as
a canon of statutory interpretation. It argues that the enacted purposes
principle has been relied upon as frequently as other recognized canons of
interpretation, and also has a strong normative and analytic justification. It
also argues that the canon is not defeated by the apparently contrary canon,
the specific governs the general.
Part VI then traces the implications the enacted purposes canon, once
recognized, for administrative law, legislative drafting, and statutory practice.
First, adherence to the enacted purposes canon in applying Chevron review
19. Id. at 137.
20. Daniel A. Crane, Enacted egislative Findings and the Deference Problem, io2 GEO. L.J. 637,
666-72 (2014).
21. Jarrod Shobe, Enacted egislative Findings and Purposes, 86U. Cil. L. REV. 669, 715 (2o019).
22. Id.at718-21.
23. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
24. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 213 (199 1) [hereinafter SCI IAUER, PLAYING BY
THE Ru[,Es].
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(and other frameworks of judicial review of agency action), constrains the
scope of deference to administrative agencies. Second, and closely related, it
shows that current legislative drafting manuals misunderstand the effects of
purpose provisions. Enacted purposes tether a statute's meaning by excluding
otherwise permissible interpretations. The proper advice to legislative drafters
is not simply to avoid these provisions, but to use them when the legislature
wants the entrenchment effects these provisions deliver. Finally, the
placement of purpose provisions in the United States Code ("U.S. Code" or
"the Code") clouds the role of these provisions. Typically, they are placed
either in the text of the Code or in the official Notes under the text of Code
provisions. Either way, the intrinsic connection between the purpose
provision and the statutory provisions they address are obscured. In a statutory
culture that has come close to relying on the United States Code as a
comprehensive statement of federal legislation, purpose provisions that
appear only in the Notes to the Code provisions fade almost entirely from
view. Focus on the enacted purposes canon as a threshold consideration in
statutory interpretation reorients our statutory practice; it reinforces the fact
that our federal legislation is an accumulation of individual statutes, with their
own purposes, not a formal code, much less the United States Code.
II. ENACTED PURPOSE PROVISIONS
Enacted purpose provisions are enacted in the sense that they appear as
part of the text of the public law after the enacting clause, typically at the
beginning of the statute's text.25 They often appear under their own headings,
typically called "Purpose,"26 "Policy,"27 or words to that effect, or combined
with "Findings,"2 but can also be found without a separate heading.29 These
25. See infraAppendices A and B (providing a sampling of statutes with purpose provisions).
26. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 15-439, § 2, 132
Stat. 5565, 5565 (2019) (including purposes under a separate heading); Border Patrol Agent Pay
Reform Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 1 13-277, § 2, 128 Stat. 2995, 2995 (stating the purpose of the Act).
27. See, e.g., Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. oo-69o, § 8oo1 (a)(3),
102 Stat. 4181, 4518 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 213 (1988)) (stating the declaration of policy and
purpose of the Act).
28. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
922-23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (including a statement of
findings and purpose); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832-33 (including a section of findings and declaration of Policy); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2, 87 Stat. 884, 884-85 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531)
(including a statement of findings, policy, and purpose); Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982, Pub. L. 97-291, § 2, 96 Stat. 1248, 1248-49 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512) (including a
provision stating the findings and purpose of the act); High-Performance ComputingActof 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-194, § 2, 105 Stat. 1594, 1594 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5502) (including a findings
and purposes section).
29. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-51 1, 92 Stat. 1783,
1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18oi) (stating the act is to authorize electronic surveillance to
obtain foreign intelligence information but not under a purpose, policy, or finding heading).
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are purpose provisions because they make statements regarding the aims,
goals, or ends of the statute they accompany, and, like definitions sections,
purport to speak to the entire statute in which they are enacted.30
Enacted purpose provisions are often confused with preambles. In a
sense, the enacted purpose provisions are descendants of the preamble in
federal legislative practice. Preambles were a common feature of legislation
in England in the sixteenth century,3, and still flourish in state statutory
practice in the U.S.32 In its classic form, the preamble begins with a "whereas"
clause,33 and then proceeds to identify the purposes the act aims to achieve.34
Preambles still frequently appear in ceremonial congressional joint
resolutions.35 Enacted purpose statements include material that might have
previously appeared under the heading of a preamble or introduced by a
"whereas" clause-that is, statements of the aims of the goals of the legislation.
The difference is the formal one that enacted purpose provisions appear in
the text of the public law, after the enacting clause, and without a "whereas"
provision.36
Enacted purpose provisions are littered throughout the public laws and
appear in tremendous variety. Some state only one overarching purpose,
37
some state multiple independent or overlapping purposes,38 some specify the
means for achieving the enacted purposes,Y and some do not.1o Federal
legislation includes over iooo enacted purpose provisions-and perhaps
substantially more. It is difficult to get a precise count. Because purposes are
mostly found in purpose sections, one rough measure is the number of
headings of the U.S. Code that contain the word "purpose." That yields over
30. Id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 50-64; see also Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56
HARV. L. REV. 388, 398 (1942) (noting this English practice).
32. See, e.g., SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, § 20:3 (noting state practice).
33. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 217.
34. ESKRIDGE, supra note 1 1, § 20:3.
35. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 44, 111 th Cong., 123 Stat. 1996 (2009).
36. In Commonwealth practice, enacted purpose provisions are called "objects" clauses. See
Jeffrey Barnes, Statutory Objects Provisions: flow Cogent is the Research and Commentary?, 34 STATUTE
L. REv. 12, 17-23 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1531) (stating the overarching purpose of conserving endangered and threatened species).
38. See, e.g., National Critical Materials Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-373, § 2o2, 98 Stat.
1249, 1249-50 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 18o) (providing multiple independent purposes of
establishing a council, program, and to stimulate industry).
39. See, e.g., Asian Elephant Conservation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-961, § 3, I 11 Stat.
2 150-51 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 4262) (stating the purpose of conserving Asian elephants
through the means of providing financial resources to conservation programs and projects).
40. See generally Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 1 15-
264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1401) (stating only the purpose of
modernizing copyright law but not the means to achieve the purpose).
[Vol. 105:2832go0
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1000 results.4' Counting only U.S. Code heading undercounts the number of
these provisions. As just noted, some do not appear in a section heading with
the word purpose; some do not appear in a separate section or are included
under another heading, such as "findings"; and, as discussed below, some
purpose statements are relegated to the official Notes of the U.S. Code.42 As
to a percentage of public laws, Shobe reports that 21 percent of the public
laws enacted from 1985 through 2oi had either a finding or purpose
provision, and nearly two-thirds of the laws over 2o pages had either a finding
or purpose provision.43 He reports that purpose provisions appeared in
approximately eight percent of public laws during that period, and with a
substantial greater percentage in laws over 20 pages.44 For present purposes,
what is important is that enacted purpose provisions appear in a significant
portion of our public laws. Moreover, enacted purpose provisions appear in a
wide variety of statutes from criminal,45 environmental,46 and securities47 to
communications48 and labor.49
III. JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON ENACTED PURPOSES
Reliance on enacted purposes has been a feature of judicial, and in
particular, Supreme Court statutory practice for decades. This Part traces the
origins ofjudicial reliance on enacted statements of purpose to early English
jurists' reliance on statutory preambles. By the end of the nineteenth century,
courts in the U.S. distinguished between statutory preambles and enacted
41. See OFFICE OF LAw REVISION COUNSEL, UNITED STATES CODE, search term: "purpose,"
available at http://uscode.house.gov/search.xhtml?searchString=head%3 A 28purposes%29&
pageNumber=2&itemsPerPage=1 oo&sortField=CODEORDER&action=search&q=%7C%3 A%
3A%3A%3A% 3A%3A% 3A% 3Afalse%3A%7 C%3A%3 A%3 A% 3A%3 A% 3A% 3 A%3 Afalse%3 A
%7Ctrue%7C%5B%3A%3A% 3A% 3A%3 A% 3A%3 A%3 Afalse%3A% 5D%7 C% 5BSGVhZGluZw
%3D% 3D% 3AcHVycGgzZXM% 3D% 5D [https://perma.cc/MSK-Q4PQO.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 282-85.
43. SeeShobe, supra note 21, at 67g n-3 1.
44. Shobe counts 1193 statutes with findings, and 760 statutes with purposes (Table i and
Table 2), so eight percent of public laws in his dataset have purpose provisions. See id. at 682-83.
My own prior estimation for 107th-i 1th Congress was 13 percent of public laws included
purpose provisions. See Stack, Inlerpreting Regulations, supra note 16, at 392 n. 197. One coding
difference that may help to explain the modest gap is that I included purposes which appear
under a heading of "policy" (such as "statements of policy" or "declaration of policy"), which
Shobe excludes. See Shobe, supra note 2 1, at 678 n.28.
45. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
922-23 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961).
46. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, Pub. L No. 88-2o6, § 1, 77 Stat 392, 392-93 (1963) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7401).
47. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881-82
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b).
48. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 76-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1o64
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151)-
49. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449,
449-50 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 15 ).
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statements of purpose, and by the 1940s, courts frequently relied on these
statements to rule out prospective interpretations that conflicted with a
statute's enacted purposes. But the Court does not call attention to its reliance
on enacted purposes as a principle, practice, or canon-and, as a result, these
decisions have not been previously associated or identified as stating a basic
principle of statutory interpretation.
A. ORIGINSINPREAMBLES
The sixteenth century English doctrine of the "equity of the statute"so
prompted Parliament to include preambles to its acts, and English courts to
begin relying on them as an authoritative source of the act's purposes.
Edmund Plowden's Commentaries, collecting and describing cases decided
between the 155os and 1570s, provides the leading account of interpreting a
statute according to its "equity."s' The idea comes through in Plowden's
famous metaphor of the law as a nut:
And the law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a
kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense
of it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make
use only of the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law, if you
rely only upon the letter, and as the fruit and profit of the nut lies in
the kernel, and not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law
consists in the sense more than in the letter. And it often happens
that when you know the letter, you know not the sense, for
sometimes the sense is more confined and contracted than the
letter, and sometimes it is more large and extensive. And equity,
which in Latin is called equitas, enlarges or diminishes the letter
For Plowden, the means for discerning the "equity" of a statute involved
consulting the statute's words but also engaging in a process of imaginative
reconstruction.53 When determining whether the letter of the statute is
"restrained" or "enlarged, by equity," the judge should suppose the lawmaker
is present; "you must give yourself such an answer as you imagine he would
50. See NEIL DUxBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION 179-90 (2013); John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 32 (2001) [hereinafter Manning,
Equity of the Statute] (noting the sixteenth century as the era of the doctrine's fullest elaboration).
51. See DUXBURY, supra note 50, at s 8o-8 I.
52. Eyston v. Studd (1574) 2 Plowd- 459, 465,
53. Partridge v. Strange & Croker (1552) 1 Plowd. 77, 82 ("[WIho may approach nearest
to their minds shall construe the words, and there are the sages of the law, whose talents are
exercised in the study of such matters."); see also DUXBURY, supra note 50, at 182. As Duxbury
explains, by "rooting out the purpose or kernel of a statute, a judge will sometimes determine
that it applies to a more limited range of circumstances than would have" resulted from applying
the statute "by reference only to its language, or its shell." DUXBURY, supra note 50, at 181.
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have done" with regard to questions touching on equity.54 In this way of
thinking, when thejudge imagines a dialogue with the legislature with regard
to a question of the equity of the statute, the judge is both conjuring a
conception of a legislature but also assuming the lawmaker wanted to achieve
ajust and reasonable construction, had he or she known of the facts at issue.55
As Plowden explains, while sage judges sometimes construe statutes contrary
to their letter, they "have 'always' interpreted 'the intent of the legislature
... according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion."'6
The interpretation of the statute in accordance with its "equity" puts thejudge
in the position of enlarging or restraining the statute based on an attribution
of ajust or equitable construction of the law to the legislature.
The breadth of this inquiry into the "equity" of the statute gave rise to
objections similar to those in our current debate, including criticizing it as
"too general" or too "dangerous" a ground for statutory interpretation.57 In
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the doctrine fell out of favor.s5 But
before it did so, it left another mark on English statutory law. As the English
scholar Neil Duxbury writes, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
statutory drafters realized that "one way to minimize the likelihood of
parliament's intentions being usurped by the predilections of an equity-
minded judge would be to include in a statute a preamble setting out
parliament's reasons for enacting it."59 Sir Francis Bacon argued the point:
"The lawyers of this realm are [sic] wont always to make light of the preamble
. . . but our preambles are annexed for exposition; and this gives aim to the
body of the statute."So Parliament began to enact preambles to anchor courts'
inquiries into the equity of the statute, and courts in turn began to give these
thopublic and authoritative statements weight.6' As Plowden reported, a
prominent jurist (Sir James Dyer) considered "the preamble ... to be ... a
key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they
intended to redress."6 2
In eighteenth century England, enthusiasm for preambles in statutory
interpretation faded, prompted by several different sources, as Duxbury
explains. On the one hand, with the increased specificity of legislative drafting
54. DUXBURY, supra note 50, at 182; Eyston, 2 Plowd. at 468.
55. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 50, at 34; see also DUXBURY, supra note 50, at
184 ("[NJot[ing] that Plowden considered the determination of unspecified legislative intention
through conjectural reconstruction to be not an end itself, but 'a good way' of determining the
equity of a statute." (quoting Warren Lehman, 11ow to Interpret a Dif/icult Statute, 1979 WIS. L. REV.
489,497)).
56. DUXBURY, supra note 5o, at 185 (quoting Stradling v. Morgan ( 56o) I Plow. 199, 205).
57. Id. at 187 .
58. Id. at 186-87.
59. Id. at 187.
6o. Id. (citing Chudleigh's Case (594), in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIs BACON 170 (1900)).
61. Id. at 207.
62. Id. at 188 (quoting Stowel v. Zouch (1572) 1 Plowd. 353, 369).
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in the eighteenth century, "the value of the preamble waned."653 More
significantly for later developments, courts began to distinguish the preamble
from the other parts of the statute. The preamble came to be seen as part of
the "descriptive" rather than the "operative" part of the statute, and so "they
cannot have the same weight as enacting provisions and so are at best aids to
construction when those provisions are ambiguous."64
A similar evolution occurred in the United States in the nineteenth
century. In Justice Story's Commentary on the Constitution of the United States,
capturing the early and mid-nineteenth century view, he endorsed the
preamble: "[T] he preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the
makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which
are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute."65 By the end of the
nineteenth century, however, this distinction between the descriptive and the
operative parts of the statute, with preambles treated as descriptive, took hold
in American law. As the Supreme Court stated in 1889, "the preamble is no
part of the act" and therefore "cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control
the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous."" That general
doctrine-that preambles are outside the act, and therefore relevant only to
clarifying ambiguities-remains the law today, and versions of it can be found
in prominent treatises on statutory interpretation.67 But this treatment of
preambles does not decide how courts would (or should) use an enacted
statement of purpose.
B. RISE OJRIJANCE IN THE TWENTIETII CENTURY
Enacted recitals of a statutes' purposes began appearing with more
frequency at the beginning of the twentieth century. From the beginning of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has treated enacted statements of
purpose differently from preambles.68 The Court clearly stated that it was
bound by the enacted recitals, and by the 1940s, the starting point for the
modern era of the doctrine, the Court's reliance became more frequent.69
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id. at 209.
65. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIURTION OF THE UNITED STATES 163
(Rotunda & Nowalk eds., 1987).
66. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889).
67. See, e.g., SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, § 47:4; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 219.
68. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931) (rejecting the suggestion that
"the court is not bound by the recital of purposes in the act," and adopting a construction of the
Act which authorized a dam for purposes of improving navigation consistent with those recitals);
United States v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 197, 205 (1906) (holding that "in view of the
declared purpose[s] of the statute" the language requiring "full payments to all persons supplying
it with labor or materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract" authorized
subcontractors in construction for the U.S. government to sue contractor under Act).
69. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 99-200 (1944) (holding
that the Railway Labor Act's "declared" purposes of "avoidance of 'any interruption to commerce
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The Court's decision in Roland Electrical v. Wallingo exemplifies this
emerging modem practice. In Roland, the Court faced the question of
whether an electrical manufacturing company fell within an exception to the
Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to "any retail or service establishment."71
The Court rejected the argument that an electrical service company doing
business with other businesses fit within this exception.72 The Court
acknowledged that this language could be read broadly to include all
employees of manufacturers who provide products and services to other firms
engaged in interstate commerce.73 But when read "in connection with the
declared purpose [s] of the Act," along with its legislative history, the Court
concluded "the exemption reaches employees of only such retail or service
establishments as are comparable to the local merchant ... who ... serves
ultimate consumers."74
As a basis for the Roland Court's understanding of the purposes of the
Act, it relied extensively on its enacted statement of purpose.75 The Act stated
its purpose was to "eliminate" labor conditions "detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health. . . and
general well-being of workers."76 The Court concluded that including the
electrical manufacturers in the exception would thwart the Act's purpose. The
Court found that the purpose "to raise living standards ... will fail of
realization" unless the Act has sufficient coverage to largely eliminate the
competitive advantage to those firms relying on substandard labor costs.77
Otherwise, the Act "will be ineffective" and will punish "those who practice
fair labor standards as against those who do not."78
The idea, reflected in Roland and earlier decisions, of the legislature
expressly stating its aims to guide judicial construction, and courts heeding
or to the operation of any carrier"' and "encouraging 'the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes'" would "hardly be attained if a substantial minority [African Americans workers]" were
denied access to the bargaining table so their only recourse was to strike); Purcell v. United States,
315 U.S. 381, 385 (1942) (relying on the "stated purpose" of the Transportation Act of 1940 "to
promote ... adequate, economical, and efficient service" as the basis for affirming the
Commission's decision to authorize a railway line that would be partially submerged by a new
dam's waters (alteration in original) (quoting Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, 899));
cf Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S- 414, 421-25 (1944) (invoking the act's "declared purposes"
as enacted to rebut argument that the act failed to provide sufficient guidance to the
Administrator so it would constitute an unconstitutional delegation).
7o. Roland Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 678 (1946).
71. Id. at 66o (addressing Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 13(a) (2),
52 Stat. o6o, 1067 (codified at time in 29 U.S.C. § 202)).
72. Id. at 667.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 666.
75. See id. at 667-68.
76. Id. at 667 (quoting § 2, 52 Stat. at o60).




those statements, found a firm endorsement in American statutory
jurisprudence of the middle of the twentieth century. Beginning in the 1940S
and extending for several decades, the legal process school was the dominant
approach to statutory interpretation in the United States, for which materials
developed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process,79 provided the
most established formulation. According to Hart and Sacks, when
interpreting a statute, the court should first endeavor to discern the statute's
purpose.so
In the years since the issuance of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks's theory
is often taken to amount to the reconstructive inquiry that a court should
"assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was
made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."",
But that is a misreading, and one which overlooks the central place of enacted
statements of purpose in their approach82 Hart and Sacks do not simply urge
courts to determine a statute's purpose by asking what a reasonable purpose
would be. They instead describe the process of determining the purpose or
purposes of legislation as having two sequential steps. First, they call for the
court to examine "formally enacted statement[s] of purpose."83 If such a
statement exists, pertains to the issue at hand, was designed to shed light on
interpretation, and is consistent with the other text of the statute, then the
court's job is straightforward: it should "accept" the formally enacted
statement of purpose.8 4 It is only if such an enacted statement of purpose is
not present or does not satisfy these other conditions that the court should
launch into the more constructive inquiry of "attributing" reasonable
purposes to the legislation.85
Reliance on enacted statements of purpose implements Hart and Sacks's
larger principle of institutional settlement-that courts should respect the
decisions of duly authorized bodies.86 The general inquiry into legislative
purpose was seen to be an objective one, looking to determine purpose
"evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external
manifestations of purpose," as Felix Frankfurter put it." Legal process
79. HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 1374-78.
8o. Id. at 1374.
81. Id. at 1378.
82. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 16, at 384-85.
83. HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 1377.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1377-78.
86. Id.; cf Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLtUM. L. REV. 527,
539 (1947) (stating that "[o]ften the purpose or policy that controls is not directly displayed in
the particular enactment" and implying that when it is so stated, it should be respected); see also
Radin, supra note 31, at 398 ("The legislature ... had the constitutional right and power to set
this purpose as a desirable one for the community, and the court or administrator has the
undoubted duty to obey it.").
87. Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 539.
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scholars seized upon a very basic insight apparent in Roland and earlier
decisions: A positively enacted statement of purpose is hard to ignore.
The explosion of statutory law post-war through the 1970s added a host
of important statutes with enacted purposes, and the Court often turned to
those statements as grounds to reject interpretations inconsistent with those
enacted purposes. In Johnson v. Robison,88 for instance, the Court
complimented Congress for "responsibly reveal[ing] its express legislative
objectives" in the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966,89 and relied
on those purposes to reject the suggestion that its benefits also applied to
conscientious objectors who performed alternative civilian service.90 In
Johnson, the claimant had latched onto one of the Act's enacted purposes of
"extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving
young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an
education."9' The Court firmly rejected that reading. It noted that the Act's
goals were also "enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed
Forces," and assisting in the "vocational readjustment and restoring [of] lost
educational opportunities" to those service men and women "whose careers
[were] interrupted or impeded by reason of active duty."92 In that light, it was
clear that the primary aim of the act was to assist those on active duty to
"readjust" to civilian life.93 The basic principle invoked was the same as in early
decisions: The declared purposes provided a basis to reject an interpretation
that would have thwarted those purposes by making a benefit targeted to
active duty personnel available to others.
Enacted purposes also supported the Court's refusal to imply an
exception in the widely-discussed TVA v. Hill decision.94 The question in Hill
was whether the Endangered Species Act of 1973's ("ESA") provisions
preventing federal expenditure on projects which jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered species prevented further funding of a federal
dam nearing completion. Section 2 of the ESA, titled "Findings, Purposes,
and Policy," declared that the Act sought "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species ... depend may be conserved,"
and policy that "all Federal departments and agencies hall seek to conserve
endangered species."95 The Court read the critical operative provision
requiring federal agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of the
88. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 376 (1974).
8g. Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358, § 1651, 8o Stat. 12,
12-13 (codified at the time at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1651 (1974)).
90. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 376-77.
gi. Id. (quoting Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Cold War Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act, S. Rep. No. 269, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 7, at 8).
92. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1651).
93. Id. at 377.
94. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
95. Id. at i8o (emphasis omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 15 3 1(b) (1976)).
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purposes of [the Act] ,"96 in light of these enacted goals.97 The invocation of
those enacted purposes supported the Court's conclusion that the ESA did
not authorize the courts to imply an exception inconsistent with the Act's goal
of conservation, even when the conservation concerned a small, obscure
fish.98 TVA v. Hill might be seen as a case where the Court used the enacted
purposes more aggressively, but a core idea was still implicated. Whatever is
permitted by the rest of the statutory text, the court should reject
constructions that result in substantive effects-like the elimination of a
species-that contradict the Act's enacted purposes.
In the same period, the Court invoked enacted purposes to reject
inconsistent interpretations of other important statutes. For instance, enacted
purposes figured in the extensive litigation arising from the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). In Firestone v. Bruch, for
instance, the Court was tasked with determining the standard of review for
challenges to benefit denials under ERISA,99 a question on which the Act was
silent. The district court had granted Firestone's motion for summary
judgment, finding that Firestone's decision to deny a termination benefit in
connection with the sale of a business unit was not arbitrary and capricious."oo
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that when an employer is itself the
fiduciary for an unfunded benefit plan, its decision to deny benefits is subject
to more stringent de novo review.o'- The Supreme Court affirmed, citing
ERISA's findings and declaration of policy in support of the conclusion that
de novo review applies.o0 "Adopting Firestone's reading of ERISA," Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court, "would require [the Court] to impose a
standard of review that would afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted."103 The Court
rejected the suggestion that de novo review would contradict the higher aims
of ERISA by discouraging employers to create benefit plans,o4 reasoning that
the grounds for de novo review, including enhancing workers protections
over pre-ERISA levels, outweighed the risk of discouraging plan creation.
05
The Firestone Court's invoked the statute's enacted purposes to establish the
96. See id. at 16o (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536).
97. Id. at 183 (construing § 7 of 19 Cong. Rec. 25664 (1973)).
98. Id. at 18-go.
99. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829;
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 1o, 102 (1989).
loo. Firesta, 489 U.S. at 106-07.
101. Id.atlo7.
102. See id. at 113 ("ERISA was enacted 'to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,' and 'to protect contractually defined benefits."' (first
quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); then quoting Massachusetts Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)) (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1001)).
103. Id. at I 13-14-
104. Id. at i 4 -15
105. Id. at 1' 5 .
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standard of review, where statute had not spoken to the issue.,o6 The Court
continued to rely on enacted purposes in the 1990s,0 7 and subsequently.,os
C. ColNEMPORARYEXAMPLES
Several more recent decisions reflect this developing practice-both in
refusing to interpret statutes in ways that contradict their enacted purposes
and in not calling attention to this practice as an interpretive choice or
principle.
First consider a 2oo6 decision, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit,o9 written by Justice Stevens, regarded as an intentionalist or purposivist
in statutory interpretation. In Dabit, the Court faced the question of whether
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") bars state
class action claims for which federal law does not authorize a claim for
relief.no In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("the Reform Act"), which made it more difficult to bring securities class
actions in federal court. " As a direct result, plaintiffs began to bring more
securities class actions in state court under state law.- To close down this
io6. Id.at iog.
107. See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 210-11, 217, 233 (1996)
(relying on the enacted purpose provision [which the Court incorrectly called its preamble]
providing that the Voting Rights Act seeks to "enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth
amendment," and therefore triggering the Court's fifteenth amendmentjurisprudence, to reject
the argument that the filing fee did not constitute a "voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting"); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S- 30, 35, 52-53 (1989) (rejecting
claim that infants born off the reservation were not "domiciles" of the tribe and subject to tribal
jurisdiction based in part on enacted statement hat "exercising their recognizedjurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, ha[s] often failed
to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people").
so8. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737 (2oo6) (Scalia,J., announcing the
judgment and authoring an opinionjoined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, and Alito,JJ.) (holding that
only a narrow construction of "waters" in the Clean Water Act is "consistent" with the Act's stated
policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to
prevent ... pollution" (citations omitted)). With the increased reliance on enacted statements of
purpose, Justices in dissent likewise have occasionally made use of these statements to batter the
majority for not paying the enacted statement sufficient heed. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl, 1 3 3 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (SotomayorJ., dissenting) ("The third clue is that the majority
openly professes its aversion to Congress' explicitly stated purpose in enacting the statute. The
majority expresses concern that reading the Act to mean what it says will make it more difficult
to place Indian children in adoptive homes . .. but the Congress that enacted the statute
announced its intent to stop 'an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [from being]
broken up.'" (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901. ()))
109. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
10. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227; Dabi4 547 U.S. at 74.
Ill. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737;
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81 (commenting that the Reform Act sought to deter class action securities
litigation in federal court).
112. See, e.g., Dahin 547 U.S. at 82.
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workaround, two years later, Congress enacted SLUSA, including an enacted
statement of its purpose "to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives" of the 1995
Reform Act."3
In Dabit, the Court relied on that enacted purpose to support a broader
reading of the preemptive scope of the Act. In particular, the Court wrote that
" [a] narrow reading of the [Act] would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995
Reform Act and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose, viz, 'to prevent
certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being
used to frustrate the objectives' of the 1995 Act."-4 The Act's enacted
purposes precluded the Court from adopting a construction that would have
continued to facilitate the very end-run SLUSA sought to prevent.
Reliance on enacted purposes found the most prominence in the Court's
decision in King v. Bunvell, authored by ChiefJustice Roberts. Because of King
v. Bunwelts importance and reliance on enacted purposes, it is worth
providing a fuller description of its context and reasoning. King v. Bunell
hinged on the interpretation of the phrase "an Exchange established by the
State"' "a under a section of the ACA.- 6 The challengers to the ACA argued
that this phrase included only exchanges-marketplaces to buy health
insurance-created by state governments, not exchanges established by the
federal government. '7 The result of that construction would be that
individuals purchasing health insurance on federally run exchanges would
not qualify for tax credits to offset the cost of health insurance the ACA
required them to buy. Those consequences would be significant for the ACA.
Thirty-four states had declined to establish their own exchanges.-8 As a result,
the only exchanges operating in those states were federal exchanges. If the
challengers prevailed, the tax credits which make the mandate to purchase
health insurance financially viable for individuals with low income would not
have been available in the majority of states.
The Court could have approached the case with a narrow focus on the
provisions of the ACA most implicated by the challenge. The Court instead
took a step back to understand the scheme that Congress devised in the
statute, a scheme that included "a series of interlocking reforms designed to
expand coverage in the individual health insurance market.", '9 Importantly
for present purposes, Congress's own enacted statements of the statute's
113. § 2(5), 112 Stat. at 3227 (listing the Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendments to
15 U.S.C. § 78a note).
114. Dabil, 547 U.S. at 86 (quoting enacted findings printed at § 2(5),1 12 Stat. at 3227).
1 15. 26 U.S.C. § 3 6B(b)-(c) (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2oo).
1 16. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
117. Id.
18. Id.
ig. Id. at 24 85.
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policy, located in its enacted introductory findings section, guided and
grounded the Court's detailed account of the ACA and the place of tax credits
within it. 2 0
As part of the statement of findings regarding the Act's effects on the
national economy and interstate commerce, Congress articulated the central
logic underlying the ACA's provisions. Congress stated that the individual
coverage requirement was critical to activating "near-universal coverage",' as
it had been under the Massachusetts plan.122 "In Massachusetts, a similar
[individual mandate] requirement has strengthened private employer-based
coverage,"123 Congress declared. Congress also stated that without such a
requirement "many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until
they needed care."124 That consequence is known in this context as leading to
an economic "death spiral," in which individual premiums continue to rise,
the number of individuals buying insurance then shrinks and ultimately
insurers leave the market.'125 But the mandate for coverage, Congress declared
in the ACA, "will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health
insurance premiums." 2
Congress's findings, which amounted to declarations of policy and
purpose,127 structured the Court's presentation and its overriding conclusion
that the reforms operated as "interlocking" elements. The Court emphasized
that "Congress found that the guaranteed issue and community rating
requirements"-obliging provision of health insurance at the same cost to
individuals with pre-existing conditions-"would not work without the
coverage requirement." 2 8 The Court went on: "In Congress's view, that
coverage requirement was 'essential to creating effective health insurance
markets,"'" 9 quoting again from Congress's findings. Moreover, the Court
viewed these three reforms-the individual mandate to obtain insurance, the
prohibition on discrimination against individuals with pre-existing
conditions, and the provisions of tax credits to individuals of limited means
120. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-43.
121. 4 2 U.S.C.§ 18og1(2)(D) (2012).
122. Id. § 18o9i(2)(I); see alo King, 13 5 U.S. at 2486 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18ogi(2) (I)).
123. 4 2 U.S.C. § 1809 1(2)(D).
124. Id.§ 180g1 (2)(1).
125. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486.
126. Id.
127. See Crane, supra note 2o, at 669-72 (noting that many "findings" made by Congress
involve normative, moral, and aesthetic judgments and hence provide a basis for legislative
deference even conceding that other institutions may be better at finding facts).
128. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18o9 I(2) (I)).
129. Id. at 2486 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2)(1)).
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-were "closely intertwined,",3, and "interlocking",'3 just as Congress had
concluded.
With this general understanding of the ACA established, the Court
turned to the Act's implicated provisions. But even there, the Court
emphasized that its duty "is 'to construe statutes, not isolated provisions,"'"32
and framed its inquiry as a contextual one:
If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its
terms ... But oftentimes the "meaning-or ambiguity-of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context". . . . So when deciding whether the language is plain, we
must read the words "in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme."'33
The Court divided its analysis of the operative provisions into two parts: first,
examining the interaction between operative provisions and, second,
considering them in light of the larger statutory scheme. Looking at the
operative provisions, the Court observed that adopting the challengers'
construction of "established by the State" would have created puzzles and
contradictions in how other provisions of the ACA operate. For instance, the
challengers' construction would have the implication that there were "no
'qualified individuals' on Federal Exchanges."34 The Court rejected that
implication, finding "the Act clearly contemplates that there [would] be
qualified individuals on every exchange."s35 This and other perplexities
created by the way in which challengers' construction works with the other
operative provisions lead the Court to observe that, considering these
operative statutory provisions on their own, the text is ambiguous. 3 6
The Court then noted that the meaning of "[a] provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme ... because only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.",37 It is at this
moment the Court then invoked the enacted purposes principle to decide the
case. The challengers' construction of the Act, the Court concluded, "would
destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal
Exchange, and likely create the very 'death spirals' that Congress designed
130. Id. at 2487.
131. Id. at 2485.
132. Id. at 2489 (quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)).
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 2489-90 (comparing operation of 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (d)(2)(A) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 18032(f)(1)(A)).
135. Id. at 2490.
136. See id. at 2492.
137. Id. (quoting United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988)).
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the Act to avoid."'13 With that premise in place, the enacted purposes
principle clinched the argument: "We cannot interpret federal statutes to
negate their own stated purposes."39 The incompatibility of the challengers'
construction with the "rest of the law" excluded an otherwise permissible
construction.
King's invocation of the ACA's enacted purposes was specific in two
respects. First, in King, the Court invoked the enacted purposes principle as
part of its inquiry into whether the statute precludes a prospective
interpretation. When read in isolation, the operative provisions might have
been considered ambiguous as to the challenges' construction. But once the
Court consider the enacted purposes, it concluded that the Act as a whole
could not permit that construction. Enacted purposes were invoked as part-
and-parcel of determining what set of interpretations the Act permitted.
Second, the enacted purposes operated to exclude prospective
interpretations, not to require the interpretation that best carries forward
those purposes. Specifically, the Court invoked the Act's enacted purpose to
bar an interpretation that would "negate" those purposes.140 The challenger's
construction would have made the ACA's mandate for health insurance
practically unachievable for those at the lowest end of the income spectrum.
Thus, in the context of King, enacted purposes preclude interpretations that
would be likely (or highly likely) to create the very consequence "Congress
designed the Act to avoid,"'4 or "produc[e] a substantive effect that is [not]
compatible with the rest of the law."142 In this sense, the doctrine bars
interpretations that will or likely will frustrate (or substantially frustrate) the
achieving enacted ends.
Consider, finally, Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 143 a
2015 decision, authored by Justice Scalia, which relies on an act's enacted
purposes but does not cite King (or any other decision) as a basis for this
reliance. In CSX Transportation, the Court held that state diesel taxes which
applied to railroads, but not to trucking companies, were prohibited under a
federal railroad act known as the 4 -R Act.4d In the 4 -R Act, Congress enacted
a "Declaration of Policy," which included a purpose of "restor[ing] the
financial stability of the railway system" and "foster [ing] competition among
all carriers by railroad and other modes of transportation."'45 The Court
relied on these purposes to conclude that trucking companies were "similarly
138. Id. at 2493 (citing N.Y. State Dep'tof Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 4 13 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973)).
139. Id. (quoting NY. State Dep't of Soc. Seros., 413 U.S. at 419-20).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2492 (quoting United Say. Ass'n of Tex., 484 U.S. at 371).
143. Ala. Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc., 1 3 5 S. Ct. 1136, 1142-43 (2015).
144. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-21o, go Stat. 3 1;
see also CSX Transp., 135 S. CL at 1143.
145. § 101(a), (b)(2), go Stat. at 33.
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situated" as a comparison class to railroads, "since discrimination in favor of
that class most obviously frustrates the purpose of the [federal act], which was
to 'restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States'
while 'foster [ing] competition among all carriers by railroad and other modes
of transportation.'"46 The alternative construction would thwart "fostering of
competition among all carriers" and thus impede the aims of the Act. The
reliance on the enacted purposes principle in CSX largely parallels that in
Dabit and King-using a purpose statement to exclude a prospective
interpretation that would thwart the statement's aims-but this time the pen
is injustice Scalia's hand.
D. SUMMARY AND QUALIFICATIONS
By identifying these decisions in which the Court relies on a statute's
enacted statement of purposes, I do not mean to suggest that the enacted
purposes principle was often or always decisive. Even in the decisions just
surveyed, arguments from enacted purposes travelled alongside engagement
with the meaning of particular provisions, legislative history, and the larger
statutory context. That is to be expected. Statutory interpretation frequently
involves consideration of multiple tools and sources. Relying on enacted
purposes can be a bedrock principle while still appearing alongside, and
occasionally in tension with, other principles; a principle need not exclude all
other considerations to be foundational.
Notice, too, that the Court relies on enacted purposes in a variety of
contexts. The Court relies on them to bar what otherwise might be the most
natural reading of the text (King, Roland; CSX); to bar implied exceptions
(TVA v. Hill); to support a relatively broad construction where the narrow
would contradict the purposes (Dabit); and to provide ground to exclude an
interpretation where Congress had been silent (Firestone). Given the diversity
of statutes and questions presented to courts, it is not surprising that enacted
purposes would be deployed in these and many different ways. Moreover,
some variations in use of enacted purposes is to be expected given the Court's
and commentators' lack of attention to the Court's practices with regard to
enacted purposes; without identification of this practice as a doctrine or
canon, there is less occasion for the Court or others to assess the consistency
of judicial practice. But what is clear is that the Court has repeatedly, over
many decades, relied upon enacted purposes to dismiss prospective
interpretations that conflict with those purposes.
IV. DEFENDING RELIANCE ON ENACTED PURPOSES
This Part defends this pattern ofjudicial reliance on enacted purposes to
exclude interpretations inconsistent with those purposes. It begins by arguing
146. CSX Transp., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1 142 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first
quoting § 'oi (a), go Stat. at 33; then quoting § i o(b) (2), go Stat. at 33).
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that statutes with enacted purposes are similar to rules with express
justifications. In both cases, the expressed justification or purpose changes
the meaning of the rule or statute. It supports thatjurisprudential point with
evidence that Congress negotiates over the language of purpose provisions
just as it negotiates over other provisions. An aspect of understanding these
provisions concerns their effects. Based on principles of political economy,
this Part then argues that interpreting statutes in light of their enacted
purposes leads to more public-regarding statutory constructions. Finally, it
situates enacted purpose provisions within longstanding debates between
textualists and purposivists, showing that attention to a statute's enacted
purposes represents a welcome point of agreement between textualism and
purposivism.
A. STATUTES WITH ENACTED PURPOSEs ARE DiFFERENT
Statutes with enacted statements of purpose have different meanings
than statutes without such statements. One way to appreciate this difference
is to examine the jurisprudence on the relationship between rules and
purposes. The question of whether a legal rule may be understood and
applied without understanding its purpose is one of the central questions in
the jurisprudential debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. On this issue,
Fuller took the view that understanding a rule always involves understanding
its purposes.147 Hart defended the idea that there are some core meanings of
rules which can be understood without making recourse to their purpose or
justification.48 The leading view among contemporary scholars is that Hart
has the stronger side of this argument.'49
But we need not adopt Fuller's position to appreciate that statutes which
state their own purposes require a distinctive approach. First consider the case
of rules. Some rules include not only a rule formulation (e.g., "no vehicles are
permitted in the park") but also an authoritative statement of the justification
or purpose of the rule (e.g., "To preserve peace and quiet, no vehicles are
permitted in the park.").so As Frederick Schauer explains in his foundational
book, Playing by the Rules, the authoritative statement of the purpose or
justification changes the character of the rule; the rule is now equivalent to
"the rule-when-consistent-with-its-justification," not merely the first-order rule
147. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv.
630, 663-66 (1958); see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 99, 103
(2005) (characterizing Fuller's position).
148. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607-o9 (1958).
'49. See MARMOR, supra note 147, at 103-16; SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note
24, at 213.
150. See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 24, at 74-76, 144, 212 (noting that a
justification can be built into the formulation of a rule).
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formulation.'5' For example, as Schauer explicates, the rule formulation, "no
sleeping is allowed in the train station," is a different rule than one which says,
"for the purposes of preventing people from using the train station as a hotel
or home, no sleeping is allowed in the train station."52 The latter rule would
prohibit sleeping only if it were consistent with the rule's purpose
-preventing people from using the train station as a hotel or home-and so
would not prohibit commuters dozing while waiting for connections between
trains. Enforcement of the latter rule as if it were enforcement of the former
rule would not heed the latter rule's purposes. Of course, even rules with
authoritative statements of purpose will still be over- or under-inclusive with
regard to some larger background purpose, say, ensuring that all members of
society have secure living arrangements.'53 But, for present purposes, the basic
point is that rules which include their own statement of justification have a
different meaning than rules that are otherwise identical but do not include
that statement. The statement of justification in the rule alters the meaning
of the provisions it accompanies. It makes applying the rule a matter of
examining the rule, but then checking prospective interpretations to make
sure they are consistent with the rule's enacted purposes or justification.
Does this same logic apply to statutes? Statutes have some distinguishing
features. Many statutes state standards (e.g., prevention of "unreasonable
risk"), not rules. 154 In addition, enacted purpose statements in statutes are not
necessarily linked to a single rule, as in the stylized examples above about
vehicles in parks and sleeping in train stations, but sometimes introduce tens,
hundreds, or even thousands, of provisions. These differences make clear
these arguments must be extended to reach statutes with enacted purposes.
That extension is a valid one. First, the fact that statutes often express
their requirements in standards, not rules, does not undermine the relevance
of an authoritative statement of purpose. While standards generally leave
more judgment to the enforcer or interpreter than rules,'u an authoritative
purpose statement could guide the application of a standard just as it does for
rules. A statute which said "for the purposes of protecting endangered
wildlife, roads shall not be constructed through parks unless there is no
feasible and prudent alternative" has a narrower meaning than the same
prohibition without the purpose clause. The addition of the purpose
provision creates a second layer of inquiry,just as it does for rules. So the point
remains: The addition of the purpose statement changes the statute; it
151. Id. at 212-13 .
152. Id.
153. Id.at212-13.
154. On the theoretical distinction between, and practical converges of rules and standards,
see Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REv. 303, 3o5-o9.
155. See id. at 3 o8-og.
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requires some consideration of the consistency of the prospective
interpretation with the enacted purposes.'56
The more complex issue is that statutes frequently include many
provisions. The coupling of a single rule with ajustification, as in the stylized
examples of train stations and vehicles in parks, suggests conscious choice by
the rule-maker about how a norm is to apply. The coupling makes it hard to
avoid the idea that the rule-maker sought the rule-interpreter or enforcer to
hold onto two ideas, the rule-formulation and the purpose, and reason back-
and-forth between them. The close nesting of the purpose and rule-
formulation also suggests careful deliberation by the rule maker. That
impression of deliberation may support the confidence the rule-enforcer feels
when applying the rule, but it is not necessary for the purpose statement to
be relevant to interpretation.
What drives the relevance is a formal feature: whether the purpose
statement is part of, or is incorporated within, the same legal act or instrument
as the provisions at issue. To see this, consider an enacted statement declaring
"disturbances to pedestrians hall be minimized" and a separate, unconnected
enactment "no vehicles in the park." Those two separate enactments are not
the same as an enactment that includes both. In this context, formality
matters. Because purpose statements are enacted as part of the text of a
156. The Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Ileller directly engaged the
relation between the Second Amendment's prefatory clause and its operative provisions based
on an analogy to mid-nineteenth century practice regarding statutory preambles. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). The IlellerCourt held that while "[l]ogic demands
that there be a link between the stated purpose [in the prefatory clause] and the command,"
prefatory clauses may "resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause" but "does not limit or expand
the scope of the operative clause." Id. at 577-78 (citing F. DWARRis, A GENERAL TREATISE ON
STATUTES 268-69 (P. Potter ed., 1871); T. SEDGWICK, THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUGrION
OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42-45 (2d ed. 1874)). To support this proposition, the
Court, with Justice Scalia writing, relied upon two nineteenth century treatises on statutory
construction. See id. at 578 (citing DwARRIS, supra, at 268-69; SEDGWICK, supaT, at 42-45). The
Ieller Court opines that "where the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative
effect, such as 'whereas' clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution's preamble, a court has
no license to make it do what it was not designed to do." Id. at 578 n.3. Heller then generalizes
further: "[T]o put the point differently, operative provisions should be given effect as operative
provisions, and prologues as prologues." Id. That final statement simply asserts a presumption,
without support, that contradicts the idea that express justifications for rules, or enacted purposes
for statutes can have an effect on their scope. Others have criticized the applicability of mid-
nineteenth century principles of statutory interpretation to the Second Amendment, as
"preamble" in the statutory context referred to materials that appear before the enacting clause,
which the prefatory parts of the Second Amendment do not. See Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller
Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1171, 1210 (2009). And that presumption does not reach enacted
purpose provisions. Enacted purpose provisions are not generally introduced with any indication,
such as a "whereas clause." More fundamentally, the enactment of purposes does not imply they
were not designed to bear on the interpretation of the statute's other provisions.
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statute, they change the statute.57 Statutes with and without purpose
provisions have different meanings.58
This logic-that authoritative purpose statements change the rules and
statutes of which they are a part-has stark implications: If a court interprets
a statute without attention to its enacted purposes, it is not reading the rule
or standard that the statute establishes. This logic supports relying on enacted
purposes to bar interpretations that otherwise may seem permissible. The
enactment of purposes instructs the interpreter to check prospective
interpretations for consistency with those purposes.
B. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE
Even if, as just argued, there are formal, analytic grounds to view enacted
purpose statements as changing statutes of which they are a part, is there
evidence that Congress considers enacted purposes as meaningful parts of the
statute?
Justice Scalia and John Garner voice a conventional skepticism over
whether purpose clauses should be treated the same way as other provisions.
They write, it "is hard to imagine, for example, that any legislator who
disagreed with that aside [the purpose provision] would vote against a bill
containing all dispositions the legislator favored."59 But as an argument
against the relevance of a purpose provision, this seems question-begging; it
asserts legislators would not view them as of interest. Given that they are part
of the text of the statute, the presumption should be in favor of their being
just as important as any other part of the text. One source of evidence that
Congress takes purpose statements as seriously as other enacted text is that
whether these statements are subject to amendments and revisions in the
legislative process. This Section highlights two examples of the purpose
provisions in prominent statutes-the Endangered Species Act and ERISA
-which were amended in the legislative process.
157. What constitutes a single statute can be complex, for instance, when a statute is
amended by a later act, adopted into a codified version of the U.S. Code, and amended again.
For present purposes, it is enough that we can recognize core cases of what counts as a statute,
either as the initial public law or the public law as amended by later acts.
158. This principle has foundations similar to a public justification approach to statutory
interpretation developed in an important article by Bernard Bell. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative
Ilistory without Legislative Intent: The PublicJustification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 6o 0110
ST. L.J. 1, 79, 83 (1999). Bell argues that Congress as an institution has a duty to provide a
justification for its decisions, and its statutes should be interpreted in light of the justifications
provide in the legislative process because those justification are public, subject to reversal by its
members, and authoritative. See id. at 83. Both Bell's public justification approach and the
enacted purposes principle maintain that statutes should be construed in light of their public
justifications. See id. One of the key differences is the source of that justification. The enacted
purposes principle relies only on formally enacted justifications whereas Bell's approach treats
some legislative history as part of the statute's public justification, and, as a result, their
justifications differ as well. See id. at 88.
159. SCAUA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 217.
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First consider the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA").16 o In the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the ESA, the purpose
provision was revised in many ways. To focus on just one of those revisions, in
House committee hearings on H.R. 37, 61 Representative Breaux offered an
amendment to Section 2 of the bill, titled, "Findings, Purposes, and Policy,"
to insert the following language: "that a key to more effective protection and
management of native fish, wildlife, and plants that are endangered or
threatened is to encourage and assist these States in developing programs for
such fish, wildlife."' 62 The Committee Chairman, Representative Dingell,
called for a vote on the amendment, and the amendment passed.,6s The
amended version of H.R. 37, which was reported in the House on July 27,
1973, included the gist of Representative Breaux's amendment.'
64 While the
original version of the Senate bill, S. 1983, did not include the language
Representative Breaux had introduced in the House,'6s the final, reported
Senate bill did include an even more explicit encouragement o States to
engage in preservation.,66 And the enacted Endangered Species Act of 1973
included almost identical language to the final, reported version of S. 1983.,67
This process of amendment looks similar to other amendments in statutory
language. An issue of importance to some members of Congress-here, the
role of states in protecting endangered species-became one of the purposes
included in the ESA's enacted statement.
The enacted purposes provision in ERISA, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974,,68 bears similar marks of amendment during the
legislative process. The enacted public law, as part of its "Findings and
Declarations of Policy," stated that it "is hereby further declared to be the
policy of this Act to protect ... the interests of participants in private
pension [s] ... by requiring plan termination insurance.",69 The requirement
for plans to obtain insurance in the event of termination is a meaningful aim.
16o. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (enacting S. 1983,
9 3d Cong. (1973))-
161. H.R.37,93dCong. (1973).
162. Endangered Species: Hearing on II.R 37 Before the Subcomm. on Fish and Wildlife of the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 9 3 d Cong. 4-6 (1973) (statement of Rep. Breaux).
163. Id. ("The 'ayes' have it. The amendment is adopted.").
164. Id. (including "to encourage and assist these States in developing programs for such
fish, wildlife").
165. See generally S. 1983, 9 3d Cong. (1973) (making no mention of States).
166. S. REP. No. 9 3 -307 , at 342 (1973) (including the following: "(5) encouraging the States,
through Federal financial assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and maintain
conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation programs which meet national and
international standards is a key to meeting the Nation's international commitments and to better
safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's heritage in fish and wildlife").
167. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(a)(5), 87 Stat. 884, 884-85-
168. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(adopting H.R. 2, 9 3 d Cong. (1973)).
169. § 2(c), 88 Stat. at 833.
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While the earliest version of the bill in the House included a similar
statement, 70 that language was dropped in the amended version of the House
bill, 7' only to reappear in the enacted bill in shorter phrasing.72
Given that enacted purpose provisions are included within the enacted
text of a statute, it should be presumed that they reflect the same level of
congressional consideration as any other portion of the statute's text.s73 These
two examples add support to the idea that purpose provisions are actively
considered, amended, and debated in the legislative process. 74
C. ENACTED PURPOSES AND PUBLIc-REGARDIN( INTEPJRETATION
Interpreting statutes in accordance with their enacted purposes also has
substantive implications for the type of interpretations adopted. By adhering
to a statute's enacted purposes, courts reach interpretations of statutes that,
in general, are more public-regarding. 17
The support for this claim relies on economic theories of legislation
which suggest that enacted purposes are more likely to contain public-
regarding elements than other provisions. In the 198os and 199os, economic
theories sought to understand legislation by examining the influence of
interest groups, the transaction costs of bargaining, and the reelection
17o. H.R. 2 ("[T]o protect the vested rights of participants against losses due to involuntary
plan termination through the establishment of vested liability insurance").
171. Id. (omitting from section 2(c) discussion of plan termination insurance).
172. § 2(c), 88 Stat. at 833 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1ool (201 2)).
173. See Shobe, supra note 21, at 689-91 (providing examples of amendment of purposes
and findings in legislative process and by subsequent legislation).
174. William Eskridge offers an additional ground for reliance on enacted purpose
provisions. As he notes, some legislative drafting manuals discourage their use. ESKRIDGE, supra
note i i, at to6; e.g., HOUSE OFFICE OF LEGistArTvE COUNSEL, MANUAL ON DRAYTING STYLE 28,
§ 325 (Nov. 1995) ("Discourage clients from including findings and purposes. Both are matters
that are more appropriately and safely dealt with in the committee report than in the bill.");
TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER's DESKBOOK: A PRACICAL GUIDE I86 (2oo6) ("A
statement of purpose can invite ajudge to bend the meaning away from the meaning your client
intended."); OFFICE OF LEGIsLArIvE COUNSEL, UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE DRAfTING
MANUAL 19, § 124 (Feb. 1997) ("Like a section of findings, a section of purposes may contain
statements that would be more appropriate to include in a committee report. However, a
purposes section can serve as a useful summary of the substantive provisions of the legislation.").
Eskridge argues that "because legislative drafters presume against including purpose provisions
unless statutory sponsors insist on them, it may be that statutory purpose clauses take on added
significance." ESKRIDGE, supra note 1 1, at Io6.
175. The term "public-regarding" is from Jerry Mashaw. Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional
Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L, REV. 849, 867-69 (1980). I adopt
Jonathan Macey's specification of the term with reference to legislation. Macey writes that public-
regarding legislation is legislation that serves a "purpose other than obtaining for particular
legislators the ... advantage of the political support of some narrow interest group."Jonathan R.
Macey, PronwingPublic-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228-29, 228 n.29 (1986). Accordingly, more public-regarding
interpretations of a statute reads provisions of the statute, including those that may benefit
narrow special interest groups, in light of the statute's public purposes.
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incentives of members of Congress. From this perspective, legislation is
understood as a deal or contract between contending interests, and interest
group analysis is used to explain what legislation Congress is likely to enact
and how Congress might design the legislation to obtain the greatest electoral
credit at the lowest cost in terms of time or risk of alienating important
constituencies. 76
Notwithstanding the prediction that narrow interest groups would be
able to extract legislation to their benefit, some scholars took the view that
the role of the courts is to implement the legislative deal as effectively as
possible. This idea provides the ground for defenses of textualism-namely
that respecting the semantic meaning allows legislators to effectively bargain
about the details of legislation.'77 Other scholars drew a different conclusion.
They did not disagree with the description of legislative dynamics but saw the
influence of interest groups on legislation as a problem to mitigate if not to
solve. Jonathan Macey and Susan Rose-Ackerman were the first to explore
how statutory interpretation might play a role in mitigating these interest
group effects, and both turned to statutory purposes as a central part of their
solution.
In Macey's classic article,178 he argues that courts can promote the public-
regarding character of legislation by interpreting it in accordance with what
he identifies as traditional principles of statutory interpretation.179 In Macey's
view of traditional statutory interpretation, "judges interpret statutes by
starting with the language and reaching a decision that applies that language
to a particular set of facts in a way that is consistent with the publicly
articulated purpose of the statute.".So Macey argues that this approach would
impose important constraints on special interest legislation. The reason is that
even legislation drafted to benefit narrow special interests will often include
what Macey described as "a public-regarding gloss."' 8' Such a gloss, Macey
suggests, would make it easier for individual legislators to support the
legislation, and thus reduce the cost to the special interest group of
persuading the legislature to adopt it.,82 Alternatively, it would be relatively
difficult for special interest groups to obtain passage of legislation without
such a gloss or that made the special interest payout clear in the statement of
the statute's purposes. Macey's core insight was that if courts read statutes in
176. Macey, supra note 175, at 231-33.
177. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stalutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 546-47 (1983);John F.
Manning, CompetingPresumptions about Statutoy Coheenc 74 FORDHAML.REv. 2009, 2033-34 (2006)
[hereinafter Manning, CompetingPresumptions].
178. See generally Macey, supra note i75 (arguing thejudiciary uses statutory interpretation as
a check on narrow interest group influence on legislation).
179. Id. at 250-56.





light of their inevitably public-regarding gloss, that mode of interpretation
will constrain the influence of special interest groups. The interest group will
not get the benefit of easing passage through a public-interest veneer or
packaging, nor realize the full scope of the statute's private-regarding
provisions.
Despite the power of Macey's theory, it was open to two important lines
of objection. First, Macey does not attend specifically to how Congress may or
must communicate the public-regarding gloss of the legislation. He suggests
it could be contained in legislative history, enacted purposes, or inferred from
other sources.'8 3 He thus opens up the critique from textualists that semantic
meaning provides the only reliable way for legislators to state the scope and
limits of their compromise.'84 Second, some quarreled with the
characterization of his purpose-oriented method of interpretation as
reflecting the traditional approach to statutory interpretation.'85
Susan Rose-Ackerman works from similar descriptive premises about
legislation, but defends a different remedy. She argues that courts "should
refuse to enforce statutory provisions that are inconsistent with legislative
preambles and policy statements," 86 and that courts should insist that statutes
contain statements of purpose.'87 By looking at these enacted statements or
official preambles, Rose-Ackerman avoids the challenge that there is no
reliable way of discerning purposes,'88 though she does so as part of a defense
of a more intrusive judicial remedy. She defends her inconsistency
principle-that courts should cast aside statutory provisions inconsistent with
enacted purposes-on two primary grounds. First, she views it as a tool which
would require (or give very strong incentives to) legislators to keep the
provisions of a statute consistent with its enacted purposes in the drafting
process.89 This approach would give voters more reliable information about
statutes-in particular, it would allow them to rely on preambles or enacted
statements of purposes as representing what the statute in fact does.9,o
Second, because the stated goals of a statute are generally public-regarding,
Rose-Ackerman's inconsistency principle would render statutes more public-
regarding, at least if they were to avoid judicial invalidation. In this regard,
her inconsistency principle is stronger in its remedial prescription. She argues
that judges should invalidate statutory provisions that are inconsistent with
183. Id. at 252-55, 262-66.
184. SeeManning, What Divides?, supra note 6, at 104 (making this argument for textualism).
185. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 297-98 (1988) (characterizing Macey's
theory is a strategy for dynamic statutory interpretation).
186. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 44.
187. Id. at 4 6.
188. See id. at 38.
189. Id.at 5 3.
go. SeeDriesen, supra note 18, at 125-26.
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the statute's enacted purposes,1'9 not merely interpret them in light of those
enacted purposes.
While they have different aims, Macey's and Rose-Ackerman's arguments
provide a strong foundation for the claim that adherence to statutes' enacted
purposes will yield interpretations that are more public-regarding. If enacted
statements of purpose are more likely to include public purposes, as they
argue, then constraining statutory interpretation on the basis of those
purposes will make the resulting interpretations more public-regarding.
D. AGREEMENT BETWEN TEXTUALISTS AND PURPOSIVISTS
Reliance on enacted purposes in statutory interpretation also represents
a point of agreement between textualist and purposivist approaches to
statutory interpretation-in theory as well as in practice.
Relying on enacted purposes is clearly consistent with purpose-based
theories of statutory interpretation. A premise of Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks's legal process purposivist technique is for a court to consult and accept
any enacted statement of purpose.'s9 Purposivists should have no objection to
a court taking seriously enacted statements of purpose, and indeed, being
bound to them as an authoritative statement of statutory purposes.'93
Purposivists deny that purpose is relevant only when the statute includes an
enacted statement of purpose and often urge courts to carry forward purpose
as far as the statute's text permits.'94 But those commitments should not
prevent purposivists from embracing the principle that when Congress
expressly declares its purposes, those statements are owed respect, and
exclude inconsistent interpretations.'95 More generally, the canon clearly
reflects the core commitment of purposivism of reading specific statutory
provisions in light of the more general purposes they implement. It does so
in a way that is particularly attentive to statutory text, thus reflecting the
principle of institutional settlement which is central to the legal process
tradition,'96 and the growing strain of new purposivistjurisprudence.97
g 19. ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 7, at 46.
192. HART& SACKS, supra note 7, at 1377.
193. See Driesen, supra note 18, at 137 ("When a statute contains explicit statements about
its purposes, the Court should generally treat these statements as a complete catalogue of the
statute's goals.").
194. See HART& SACKS, supra note 7, at 1375-77.
195. See id. at 1377.
196. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
197. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1842-46 (2oo) (giving account of
"modified textualism" or "structured purposivism" in state statutory interpretation); John F.
Manning, The New Purposivism, 2oi SUP. CT. REv. 113 (201) (articulating new purposivism
reflected in Supreme Court statutory interpretation); Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 16, at
362 (defending positively grounded purposivism as the method for interpreting regulations).
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The more difficult issue is whether textualists would also embrace the
reliance on enacted purposes to exclude inconsistent interpretations. One
way to see that this practice is consistent with textualism's commitments is to
consider textualism's core objection to purpose-based interpretation. Frank
Easterbrook formulated this concern in a way that proved to be a central
foundation for textualism. In Easterbrook's article, Statutes' Domains,,9
8 he
directly challenges the idea that statutory purposes are relevant to statutory
interpretation when the statute specifies the means of implementation.
Easterbrook writes:
A legislature that seeks to achieve Goal X can do so in one of two
ways. First, it can identify the goal and instruct courts or agencies to
design rules to achieve the goal. In that event, the subsequent
selection of rules implements the actual legislative decision, even if
the rules are not what the legislature would have selected itself. The
second approach is for the legislature to pick the rules. It pursues
Goal X by Rule Y. The selection of Y is a measure of what Goal X was
worth to the legislature, of how best to achieve X, and of where to
stop in pursuit of X. Like any other rule, Y is bound to be imprecise,
to be over- and under-inclusive. This is not a good reason for a court,
observing the inevitable imprecision, to add to or subtract from Rule
Y on the argument that, by doing so, it can get more of Goal X. The
judicial selection of means to pursue X displaces and directly
overrides the legislative selection of ways to obtain X. It denies to
legislatures the choice of creating or withholding gapfilling
authority.99
Easterbrook's point here is that courts should create neither implied
exclusions nor implied extensions to better conform the statute to its goal or
purpose when a statute specifies the means of implementation (as opposed to
simply delegating those choices to the agency or court). In other words,
judges "are bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected,
but by the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit
of those purposes."oo
This set of ideas has been a basis for sophisticated defenses of textualism
and their critique of legal process purposivism. Textualists argue that
adherence to semantic meaning provides the best way for courts to adhere to
the means Congress has selected, and for legislators to "express the relevant
limits on how far they are willing to go."2o Conversely, John Manning argues,
if a court were "to give background purpose priority over semantic detail," it
198. Easterbrook, supra note 177, at 545-47.
199. Id. at 546-47.
200. See, e.g., Manning, Competing Presumptions, supra note 177, at 2033 (quoting MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 2 18, 231 n-4 (1994)).
201. Id. at 2040.
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would be "quite difficult to fathom how a legislator with the power to exact a
compromise could bargain reliably for any particular outcome."2o2 The
challenge presented here is that allowing background purposes to influence
interpretation of the more specific provisions in statutes ends up overriding
Congress's choices about means and undermining its capacity to specify those
means.20
These are substantial arguments, but reliance on enacted purposes does
not implicate them-and the reasons why it avoids them exposes a central
analytic ground for embracing interpretation in accordance with enacted
purposes. A premise of these critiques is that one can distinguish the "rule"
or the "means" established by the statute from its "purpose" or "purposes."
This premise could be understood as stating the idea that adherence to a rule
or means established by the statute does not necessarily require resorting to
the statute's purpose. But when a statute includes a statement of purposes,
that statement is not some background consideration, but part-and-parcel of
the choices made in the statute.20 4 With such enacted statements, it is not
possible to cordon off the statute's purposes from its means; the purpose and
the other provisions are intrinsically connected in the statute's text. More
specifically, as argued above, the purpose becomes part of the overall rule the
statute establishes such that its specific provisions must be read in light of its
enacted purposes. In other words, for statutes with enacted statements of
purpose,just as for rules with stated justifications, the purpose orjustification
alters the rule-formulation.2os It provides that the means should be
implemented only when they, at the very minimum, do not nullify the enacted
purposes of the statute.2o6
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., id. at 2033-34.
204. Cf Shobe, supra note 21, at 718 (noting that purpose provisions "are part of the
complicated legislative bargain that led to enactment of the statute and so should be viewed as
such rather than ignored or marginalized").
205. As Schauer puts it when talking about rules: "[A] rule in such a system [in which rules
are taken as some combination of the meaning of the rule-formulation and the authoritative
purposes] might very welljust be the meaning of the formulation if and only if the result indicated
by the formulation were consistent with the result indicated by the rule'sjustification." SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 24, at 212 (emphasis omitted). Of course, as Schauer also
points, out even a rule with a justification and formulation will still be over- and under-inclusive
as to some other larger purpose. But that point does not undermine the more basic thought that
enactment of a purpose changes the statute. Id.
206. For textualists, this point also distinguishes the enacted purposes canon from the
absurdity doctrine. The enacted purposes canon should be unobjectionable because it merely
requires reading given effect to part of the statutory text-purpose provisions. In contrast,
textualist have grounds to reject the absurdity doctrine. As John Manning writes, for textualists,
the absurdity doctrine is objectionable because it invites courts to read statutes in light of values
that are not enacted as part of the legislative bargain. SeeJohn F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2003).
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Indeed, the point can be made stronger still. Textualism is committed to
formality. It takes the formal enactment of the legislative text as the object of
interpretation. Given that enacted purposes proceed through the same
bicameral and presentment process as the statutes of which they are apart,
textualists have no grounds to reject their relevance to interpreting the
statute. A textualist who disregards enacted purposes contradicts the core
premise of textualism, that the formality of enactedness is the decisive
consideration.
This common ground between purposivism and textualism is not only
theoretical. As discussed above,2o7 Supreme Court Justices with otherwise
opposed positions on statutory interpretation have relied upon enacted
statements of purpose. Indeed, relying on enacted purposes builds directly on
the most general and fundamental practice of the federal judiciary
-attending to statutory text and purpose.2os Once articulated, it should be an
easy case for pragmatist jurists as well as for those who fall closer to the
extremes of the interpretive continuum. The attention to enacted purposes
helps, in addition, to build on the developing strain of new purposivist
thought. This strain of thought does not use purpose to override text, as some
purposivists had been understood, but views the statute's purpose as an
important, and even anchoring, consideration in statutory and regulatory
interpretation .209
We have many reasons to take enacted purposes seriously in statutory
interpretation. When they appear, these purposes change the meaning of the
provisions they accompany. Moreover, public choice theory suggests that
relying on enacted purpose will nudge statutory interpretations in a more
public-regarding direction, at least by excluding some private-regarding
constructions that may have been permitted by the statutory text but not by
its purpose provision. Reliance on purpose provisions also accords with the
basic formal commitments of textualists to legislative text and of purposivists
to reading the specific in light of the general. Should these practices be
treated as a canon of interpretation?
V. THE ENACTED PURPOSES CANON
This Part argues that reliance on enacted purposes is not only a
foundational principle of statutory interpretation but warrants recogmition as
207. See supra Section III.C.
208. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-
Two Judges on the lederal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1310 (2o18) (characterizing
results of survey showing that mostjudges view themselves pragmatically with commitment to text
and purpose).
209. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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an interpretive canon, under which a court will reject any prospective
interpretation that negate-that are inconsistent with or likely in practice to
thwart-the enacted purposes of the statute. It finally contends that relying
on enacted purposes i not defeated by the canon stating that the specific
governs the general.
A. LABELS
Not every principle or judicial practice should be considered a canon
-a point Anita Krishnakumar and Victoria Nourse forcefully argue.210 To be
considered a canon, Krishnakumar and Nourse identify three factors-the
frequency that the principle has been invoked by the Supreme Court, its
longevity, and itsjustification.2 They reject the idea that the Court must have
identified that canon as such.212 Based on the sensible criteria Krishnakumar
and Nourse identify, the enacted purposes canon qualifies.
As to frequency of reliance, Krishnakumar and Nourse suggest hat seven
to ten citations in Supreme Court opinions since 1970 is a reasonable figure
for frequency.213 The enacted purposes canon easily meets the mark. It has
been relied upon scores of times over decades.214 Longevity, as Krishnakumar
and Nourse observe, cannot mean only those maxims that find a place in
Blackstone, as many current canons do not.2 1 Rather, they argue that reliance
on the canon over a long period of time-generations at the Court
-strengthens the argument for the principle being considered a canon.21 6
The Supreme Court's reliance on enacted purposes for almost a century also
adds force to considering it a canon.21 7 Finally, as to justification,
Krishnakumar and Nourse posit that the principle must not only be embraced
over time, but also by Supreme CourtJustices appointed by different parties
and across the ideological divide.218 The enacted purposes canon satisfies that
criteria as well.219 It has the status of a well-established principle; even if it has
been rarely remarked upon or noticed, frequent reliance by a broad array of
juristsjustify treating it as a canon.220
The enacted purposes canon is most readily classified as a language
canon, though it could be viewed as a substantive canon as well. Language
210. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEx. L. REV.
163 (2019) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, supra note Ii).
211. Id. at 18i-gi.
212. Id. at 1go.
213. Id. at 183 .
214. See supra Part II.
215. See Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 2 1o, at 184-88.
216. Id. at 18 5 -
217. See supra Section III.B (describing use of canon in Supreme Court).
218. Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 210, at 188.
219. See supra Section III.C.
22o. Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 210, at 8g-go.
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canons (also called linguistic canons) call upon the interpreter to make
inferences about statutory meaning from the way words are used as well as
from "the presumed relationship between particular words and language
found in other parts of the same statute or in similar statutes."221 In contrast,
substantive canons are interpretive principles or tiebreakers that protect
background values, such as clear notice of criminal liability and construing
statutes to avoid constitutional doubts when such a reading is fairly possible.222
The enacted purposes canon shares elements of a language canon
because it asks the court to make inferences about the meaning of operative
statutory provisions in light of the enacted purposes of the same statute. It says
that prospective interpretations inconsistent with those purposes are
foreclosed. A broom provides a useful mental image: The purposes provision
provides a clasp to the fibers of the broom. The fibers, or operative provisions,
need to remain consistent with the clasp or they will snap. Moreover, as a
language canon, it applies as part of the determination of whether the statute
is ambiguous, as opposed to a substantive canon which is invoked only after
the ambiguity determination. Finally, because the enacted purposes canon
makes inferences between provisions of the same act, asking the reader to
consider the entire text, structure, and logical relations among its parts,2 2 3 it
looks most like a whole act language canon.
2 2
4
Yet the enacted purposes canon also can be defended on substantive
grounds. Indeed, Part IV argues that relying on enacted proposes guides
courts to reach more public-regarding interpretations of statutes. For those
persuaded by those substantive arguments, the enacted purposes canon might
be viewed as a substantive canon-a presumption adopted because it serves a
substantive value. Because the canon involves making inferences between
different parts of the statutory text, like language canons, it is best viewed as a
species of whole act canon, but one which has a strong substantive
justification.
Notice, finally, that this formulation of the enacted purposes canon is not
subject to the objections raised to Macey's and Rose-Ackerman's
consideration of purpose in statutory interpretation. First, in contrast to
Macey's view, it makes the identification of purposes clear; it applies to
enacted purposes. Second, in contrast to Rose-Ackerman, the effect of an
221. JamesJ. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and WoofofStatutory Interpretation: Comparing
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1239 (2009).
222. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 833
(2o 17).
223. See ScALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 167 (characterizing whole text canons). It also
bears a resemblance to Scalia and Garner's identified "harmonious-reading" canon which
provides that the "provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them
compatible, not contradictory." See id. at 190.
224. Eskridge and Shobe also conclude that attention to enacted purposes is part of the
whole act rule. See ESKRIDGE, supra note i 1, at i o2-o6; Shobe, supra note 21, at 712.
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enacted purpose canon is more modest. Rose-Ackerman advocates forjudicial
invalidation of statutory provisions that are inconsistent, whereas the enacted
purposes canon more modestly seeks to exclude inconsistent interpretations
of the statute. Relying on enacted purposes only would exclude
interpretations that thwart a statute's enacted purposes. 5
B. SUBSTANCE
Canons of statutory interpretation have hardly been darlings of jurists
and scholars. Since Karl Llewellyn's famous pairing of canons as "thrusts" and
"parries," canons have been criticized as contradictory and unreliable tools.226
While the Roberts Court relies extensively on canons, 27 recent empirical
studies-examining both congressional staffers' knowledge of canons and
judicial use of them-have sharpened the general critique of canons, and of
language canons in particular. The enacted purposes canon avoids the brunt
of these critiques.
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman's study of congressional staffers found
that they had surprisingly little knowledge of many prominent statutory
canons.228 Their study raises fundamental questions about the basis for
judicial reliance on many canons.2 2 9 Not surprisingly, given the point of this
225. It is important to note that attention to enacted purposes in statutory interpretation is
far from a comprehensive response to the problems of interest group dominance in the legislative
process. As Anita Krishnakumar argues,judicial canons of construction address tatutes only years
after they have been enacted, if at all. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A
Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12 (2oog). As a result, as
Krishnakumar explains, adoptingjudicial canons that seek to mitigate private interest legislation
"is likely to be after-the-fact judicial curtailment of the reach of statutes deemed to be rent-
seeking," but not curtail "the production of fewer rent-seeking statutes or more public-regarding
statutes in the first place." Id. at 13. The enacted purposes canon will only apply to those statutes
for which Congress has included an enacted purpose. But where it applies, the canon has the
benefit of pushing statutory law in public-regarding directions. Express recognition might make
them a more prominent piece of legislative negotiation, though it is uncertain whether that
would mean these provisions end up appearing more or less frequently in legislation.
226. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 40i-o6 (1950).
227. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation:
Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court's First Decade, 1 17 MICH. L. REV. 71, 99 (2018) (reporting
that majority opinions in the Roberts Court considered canons for "roughly 70% of contested
statutory issues").
228. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REv. gol, 930
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part 1] (listing six most common textual canons included
in their survey of congressional staffers); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REv. 725, 744-46 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part 17].
229. Nina Mendelson's recent article examining use of the canons Gluck and Bressman
study, among others, shows that the Court is relying on canons that Bressman and Gluck found
least support for in Congress. See Mendelson, supra note 227, at 79 ("Three, and possibly four, of
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Article, their study did not ask their respondents about the enacted purpose
canon; they focused on already recognized canons. The closest proxy in their
study is the best-known of the whole act canons, the principle that "statutory
terms are presumed to have a consistent meaning throughout a statute."23o
Their study showed that less than 50 percent of their respondents recognized
this "consistent usage" version of the whole act canon by name, 
2 31 though
their results do not reveal the percentage that used the underlying concept.
2 32
Most respondents viewed consistent usage as a goal in statutory drafting, but
perceived the realities of bill-drafting by multiple committees, bundled deals
on language, and time pressure as barriers to achieving that goal.233
Nina Mendelson's recent study of the Roberts Court's use of canons
pushes the critique of canons a step further.234 Mendelson's study reveals the
scope of confusion that attends almost every canon, though she too does not
single out the enacted purposes canon.2 35 Her findings reveal that when the
Court engages (in the sense of mentioning) one canon, it typically also
invokes another canon; that canons were not relied upon at least 25 percent
of the time they were engaged; and that the Court has developed a wide array
of reasons for not applying individual canons.23
6 These results, as Mendelson
argues, severely undercut the claim that recognized canons serve as stable
background principles for drafting. Based on this welter of problems,
Mendelson isolates a principle for reliance on canons: Canons should be
relied upon only when application can "still be justified on first-order
grounds-as connected to congressional preferences or" because the canon
serves an important external value.237
The enacted purposes canon can satisfy Mendelson's principle. Most
importantly, Part IV argues that relying on enacted purposes has a strong
analytic and normativejustification .3 8 If those arguments are sound, then the
the five most frequently applied canons in the Roberts Court were identified by Gluck and
Bressman as canons outright 'rejected' by congressional staff. . ..
230. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 228.
231. Id. at 931.
232. Id. at 932 ("Results for the whole act rule are not reported. Although most respondents
knew that rule, most qualified their use of it in the comments.").
233. Id. at 936.
234. See Mendelson, supra note 227, at 131-35 (exposing gap between those canons most
relied upon by the Roberts Court and those canons congressional drafters had greatest
knowledge, as reported in the Gluck & Bressman study).
235. SeeMendelson, supra note 227, at 90-94.
236. See id. at io6-o.
237. Id. at s go; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
1o6 COLUM. L. REv. 1189, 1193 n.9 (2006) (stating that conscientious use of canons requires
"consideration of the values it is meant to serve, as well as the fit between those values and the
context of the interpretation").
238. David Driesen and Susan Rose-Ackerman argue that construing statutes in line with
their purpose provisions increases legislative transparency because it anchors statutes to the most
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enacted purposes canon has justification independent from congressional
practice, satisfying Mendelson's demand for first-order justification.
While there is a need for more empirical research on Congress's
understandings and practices with regard to enacted purpose provisions,
there are several reasons to think that the enacted purposes canon would have
broader recognition in Congress than other whole act canons. First, the
inference underlying the enacted purposes canon is different than that in the
consistent meaning canon. It may be implausible, as the Gluck and Bressman
study suggests, to assume that legislative drafters have the time to think
through how terms are used across a statute, much less across a statute with
multiple amendments. Consistent usage canons require (or presume) that
staffers think through a web of back-and-forth inferences from each use of a
term to each other use. The enacted purposes canon requires only that the
specific terms be read in light of the enacted purposes. The inference is
simpler, just asking the drafter to consider each part of the statute in relation
to the purpose provision, not each word use in relation to every other use in
the statute. To return to the image of a broom, the enacted purposes canon
simply asks for each fiber of the broom to be considered in relation to the
clasp, or purpose provision. It does not require cross-referencing every use of
a term with every other use in the statute-that is, it involves no fiber-to-fiber
considerations, just fiber-to-clasp. Moreover the inference has a stronger
structural basis. Purpose provisions, like definition sections, generally appear
under separate headings, at the beginning of a statute, and purport to address
the entire statute that follows. Those facts are not hidden from Congress.
Finally, as noted above, the general presumption that purpose provisions
receive the same kind of consideration as other aspects of statutes finds
support in the legislative history of the ESA and ERISA.
C. Is TDEFA TED BY "THlE SPECIFIC GovRNs THE GjNERAL"?
"[I] t is a commonplace of statutory [interpretation] that the specific
governs the general."239 This "general/specific canon,"240 poses a serious
objection to the enacted purposes canon. Other provisions of a statute will
(almost by definition) be more specific than those in the purpose provision.
Does the general/specific canon defeat the enacted purposes canon?
The short answer is that if the general/specific canon is given an abstract
formulation, it would wash away the enacted purposes canon-and much else
too. In almost every case in which the enacted purposes are invoked, they are
engaged to assist in the reading of a more specific statutory provision. (Think
prominent, easy to understand, and accessible parts of legislation. SeeROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note
17, at 44-46; Driesen, supra note 18, at 126-27.
239. Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (quoting




of King, where the question was the meaning of "established by the State.")241
If the general/specific canon were read in a highly abstract way, the enacted
purposes would never be relevant to the interpretation of the more specific
provisions (because the specific governs the general). Whatever uncertainties
were involved in the more specific provisions would need to be resolved using
other tools.
The longer and stronger answer is that the general/specific canon does
not, properly understood, have that full, abstract reach, nor does it operate to
trump the enacted purposes canon. First consider Justice Scalia and Bryan
Garner's characterization of the canon in their treatise: "If there is a conflict
between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision
prevails."242 What becomes clear in their exposition is that the canon applies
only to a clash of operative provisions typically in the form of permissions
versus prohibitions. It applies when the specific permission is viewed as an
exception to a general prohibition, or the specific prohibition is treated as an
exception to the general permission. It also applies where there is a more
general authorization alongside a more specific authorization (for instance,
one provision authorizing a seizure and another provision authorizing seizure
provided specific procedures are followed) .243 The canon ensures that "[t] he
terms of the [more] specific authorization" are complied with.244 The
rationale is that "the specific provision comes closer to addressing the very
problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of credence."245
The key implied limitation is that the general/specific canon applies to
conflicting provisions which have operative effects, whether by granting
permissions, exceptions, or creating prohibitions or authorizations. Purpose
provisions, in contrast, may narrow the interpretation of specific or general
provisions, but they do not themselves have operative effects such as creating
permissions, prohibitions, authorizations, etc. Therefore, the general/
specific canon, properly understood, simply does not apply to enacted
purposes; it is relevant only to the play of operative provisions that directly
conflict. Indeed, both canons can coexist. Neither a specific nor a general
operative provision should be read to negate the statute's enacted purposes.
But when there is a conflict between a specific operative provision and a more
general one, the general/specific canon applies.
The fact that enacted purposes may state aims or policies, not specific
requirements that apply to private parties or government officials, does not
make them merely discretionary or somehow less part of the "law" the statute
241. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)).
242. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 183.
243. See Radiax, 566 U.S. at 645-46.
244. Id. at 64 5 .
245. SCALA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 183; see also 3 THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTIIAM 210
(John Bowring ed., 1843) ("The particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact
view of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.").
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establishes. As Edward Rubin has pointed out, much contemporary legislation
does not impose rights and duties on individuals but imposes duties on
administrative officials to create first-order obligations on private parties.246
Imposing obligations on private parties is not a criteria of law or legislation.
Nor does it make sense to disregard statements of purpose because, if read in
an isolated manner, they would not constitute sufficient commands for courts
to implement. The fact that statements of purpose are not sufficient to compel
any particular behavior does not imply that they are extrinsic to the law the
statute creates.247
This is not to suggest that courts always properly limit the general/
specific canon. Sometimes they misapply the general/specific canon, using it
to rebut inferences from purpose in general.248 But it is only the misuse of the
general/specific canon that washes away the enacted purposes, and enacted
purposes provisions as well.
In sum, the duration and frequency of the Supreme Court's practice of
relying on enacted statements of purpose to bar inconsistent interpretations,
combined with the analytic and normative grounding for this practice, justify
recognizing it as a canon of interpretation. Explicit recognition of the enacted
purposes canon is a first step toward prompting courts and scholars to engage
in further refinement of the conditions for its application and interactions
with other canons.
VI. BEYONDJUDICIAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The focus of the Article thus far has been identifying and defending a
principle of statutory interpretation-the enacted purposes canon. But this
principle, once identified, has implications for judicial review of agency
action, how Congress writes statutes, and our larger statutory practices. This
Part briefly considers those implications.
A. CIEVRON AND ENACTED PURPOSES
Whenever a court assesses whether a statute permits an agency's action,
it must engage in statutory interpretation. That is true regardless of whether
the court is applying the Chevron framework or a less deferential standard.
The enacted purposes canon plays an important role in how these frameworks
apply.
246. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369,
376-77 (1989).
247. Cf Crane, supra note 20, at 655-59 (defending enacted findings as having the force of law).
248. See, e.g., Radlax, 566 U.S. at 649 (finding that "nothing in the generalized statutory
purpose of protecting secured creditors can overcome the specific manner of that protection
which the text of § 1129 (b) (2) (A) contains").
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First consider Chevron.249 As is familiar to students of administrative law,
the Chevron doctrine structures how a court assesses an agency's interpretation
of statutes the agency administers.250 Chevron formally divides the judicial
inquiry into two-steps. First, the reviewing court asks whether the statute
speaks directly to the precise question at issue.25, This step is best understood
as asking "whether the statutory language precludes the meaning attached to
it by the agency."252 To make this step one inquiry, Chevron advises that the
reviewing court should employ "traditional tools of statutory construction."253
If the statute does not directly address the issue, then Chevron commands a
court to accept the agency's construction of a statute it administers so long as
the construction is reasonable.254
Consideration of enacted purposes-specifically, the enacted purposes
canon-applies in the court's threshold evaluation of whether the statute
precludes the meaning attached to it by the agency. Recall that the enacted
purposes canon operates to preclude interpretations that might otherwise
seem permissible when the specific provisions of the statute are viewed in
isolation. When the canon applies, it eliminates ambiguity that may have
existed based on the text of specific statutory provisions and exposes that the
statute excludes otherwise permissible interpretations that thwart its enacted
purposes. The canon operates in determining what the statute must mean,
not only in determining what it may mean.2 55 That is the same question the
Court is asking at Chevron's threshold inquiry into whether the statute
precludes the meaning the agency has attached to it.
Under established doctrine, courts treat inferences drawn from the text
of statutes as well as consideration of purpose as part of the initial examination
of whether an authorizing statute precludes the agency's view. Indeed, courts
consult the purpose of a statutory provision or the statute as a whole as part
of the Chevron step one inquiry.256 The enacted purposes canon merely guides
that examination whenever the statute includes a purpose provision. It thus
249. Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding a court reviewing agency statutory interpretation must accept any reasonable agency
construction of a statute the agency administers as long as the statute does not clearly speak to
the issue).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 84 2- 4 3 .
252. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and
'Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1162 (2012).
253. Cheuron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.10.
254. Id.
255. Shobe reaches the same conclusion that because enacted purposes are part of the
statutory text, and thus "the whole legislative bargain, an interpreter cannot say that the rest of
the text is clear or unambiguous without first consulting them." Shobe, supra note 21, at 714.
256. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, i 3 6 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) ("[W]hether we
look at statutory language alone, or that language in context of the statute's purpose, we find
... a 'gap' that rules might fill, and 'ambiguity' in respect to the boundaries of that gap.").
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fits comfortably in the Court's consideration of purpose in the Chevron
threshold inquiry.57 While there are reasons to be cautious about hinging a
rejection of any agency's view based on a single language canon, 58 and
reasons to be cautious generally about reliance on canons, courts treat
language canons as among the tools they consult in step one.2 59
It might be objected that allowing courts to consider the purposes of
statutes, purposes with which agencies are deeply familiar, undermines the
underlying logic of Chevron. If agencies have more expertise concerning how
a purpose is best implemented, shouldn't a court defer to the agency's view?
The answer is yes, and nothing about the enacted purposes canon's operation
in the context ofjudicial review of agency action bars that view. All the enacted
purposes doctrine does is reinforce to courts that it is their job-as part of
their independent construction of the meanings precluded by the statute
-to determine if the agency's action contradicts the statute's enacted
purposes. That is, the domain of agency discretion that Chevron allows does
not include issuing rules or orders which contradict the statute's enacted
purposes. But the agency still has discretion over how those purposes are best
implemented.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home6o provides an illustration. In Sweet Home, landowners
and logging companies challenged the validity of a regulation issued by the
Secretary of Interior prohibiting significant habitat modification in lands
inhabited by endangered species.26' The ESA prohibits "taking" of
endangered species, and defines "take" as including "to harass, harm,
pursue."26 The Secretary interpreted the term "harm" broadly as a basis to
prohibit indirect takings of endangered species through habitat
modification.263 The challengers alleged that the ESA did not permit the
Secretary's interpretation.264 The Court disagreed, holding that the ESA
permitted the Secretary's construction.265 The Court upheld the Secretary's
257. For those who see the enacted purposes canon to be a language canon, there is an
additional doctrinal ground for seeing the canon within the step one inquiry. Under established
law, language canons are also part of the "traditional tools of statutory construction" that Chevron
invites courts to use at its first step.
258. Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that expressio uniscanon has little application in review of permissibility of agency action
under Chevron).
259. Higgins v. Holder, 677 F-3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that statutory canons
apply in the Chevron step one inquiry); see alsoMejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 585 (4 th Cir. 2017)
(relying on statutory canons in Chevon step one and characterizing them as part of the traditional
tools of statutory construction).
260. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
261. Id. at 692.
262. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012).
263. Sweet Home 515 U.S. at 696.
264. Id. at 693-94-
265. Id. at 703-04.
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construction under Chevron's second step, concluding that it was a
"reasonable"26 6 and "permitted" construction, but not required. However,
because the challengers had argued and the lower court held2
67 that the
statute precluded the Secretary's construction, the Supreme Court still had to
judge what the statute permitted and what it precluded, a blurring of Chevron's
steps that sometimes occurs.261
In the course of rejecting the suggestion that the ESA unambiguously
precluded the Secretary's interpretation, the Court relied on the statute's
text, purpose, and legislative history.269 The "broad purpose of the ESA
supports the Secretary's decision," the Court wrote, specifically invoking the
Act's stated purpose "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species . . . may be conserved."27o Consistency with the Act's
purpose thus was one factor the Court assessed in concluding that the statute
did not preclude the Secretary's view. That is, enacted purpose applied to
determine the scope of the Secretary's power under the statute.
The application of the enacted purposes canon as part of the assessment
of what the statute permits, as in Sweet Home, has a stark implication: The
reviewing court will defer to an agency's construction under Chevron only
when that decision is consistent with the statute's enacted purposes. While it
augments the role of the courts at step one, it is a sensible result. An agency
should not receive deference for an interpretation that negates the statute's
enacted purposes. Consideration of enacted purposes thus narrows the range
of agency interpretations that qualify for deference to those consistent with
enacted purposes. This limitation has the most significance in two
circumstances: first, when a relatively deregulatory presidential
administration is implementing relatively pro-regulatory statutes, and second,
when a relatively pro-regulatory presidential administration implements
relatively deregulatory statutes.
The first circumstance is particularly timely. One of the Trump
administration's clear goals has been to reduce the cost of regulation on the
American economy,27' and President Trump has sought to appoint agency
266. Id. at 697.
267. Id. at 694.
268. See, e.g., Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones Telecomms., 550 U.S. 45, 47-49
(2007) (upholding the FCC's action stating as "reasonable" and "hence it is lawful" without
specifying whether its decision was at Chevron's first or second step); see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ.
ON REG 1, 30 (1998) (finding, in a study of over 200 courts of appeals cases, that courts
"condensed the two-step test into a single question of whether the interpretation was 'reasonable'
in 28% of the applications").
269. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696-703.
270. Id. at 698.
271. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 § 2(a)-(c) (Jan. 30, 2017)
(requiring that for every one new regulation issued two existing regulations be identified for
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heads who will roll back regulations in environmental protection, securities,
energy and elsewhere.272 But many existing regulatory statutes include
enacted purposes with broadly regulatory goals, ranging from protecting
endangered species to protecting the American consumer.2 73 Deploying the
enacted purposes canon does not require that agencies carry forward those
goals to the fullest extent possible. But, as argued, it does bar a court adopting
an otherwise permissible construction that negates those enacted purposes.
That inquiry into negation will impose a significant constraint on
deregulatory policies. To survive a Chevron challenge, the agency will need to
show that its new deregulatory decisions do not negate stated statutory
goals.274 Often that showing will be easy to make. But where the agency
completely or substantially rescinds its own prior action that furthered the
statute's enacted purposes, the showing will be more difficult. The agency will
have to demonstrate that its construction is not precluded by the statute's
enacted purpose. In a sense, the enacted purposes canon exposes the tension
and possible conflict between the policy of the statute and the administrative
policy adopted. It does not require every administration to further those
purposes as far as possible-but it does require all policy be consistent with
them.
The enacted purposes canon will have the same effect when a pro-
regulatory presidential administration is implementing more deregulatory
statutes. There, too, the canon will deny deference to agency actions that
negate stated deregulatory purposes.
While Chevron still provides the most prominent framework for review of
agencies' statutory interpretations, the same analysis would hold under less
deferential standards, such as Skidmore, 75 de novo review, and arbitrariness
review. Briefly: Under Skidmore, while the court takes seriously the agency's
own deliberate analysis,276 the court reaches its own construction of what the
statute means. That construction will involve consulting the statute's enacted
purposes, and disallowing agency action that negates those purposes in the
same manner as under Chevron.277 Regardless of the standard of review, the
elimination, and requiring that agencies not issue regulations that impose additional costs of
compliance not offset by the repeal of existing regulations).
272. See, e.g., Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The Deep Industry Ties of Trump's Deregulation
Teams, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2o17/o7/11 /business/the-deep-
industry-ties-of-trumps-deregulation-teams.html [https://permacc/7ECX-E2GC] (reporting on
the many positions in Trump's administration that are filled with industry insiders).
273. See infra Appendices A and B (collecting statutes with purpose provisions).
274. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 55-56
(1983) (reversing agency rescission which did not carry forward the purposes of the act).
275. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)-
276. See id. at 140 (stating that the care of the agencies reasoning will influence the weight it
is given by court).
277. A parallel inquiry also arises in the context of review of whether an agency's action is
"arbitrary" and "capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 7o6 (2012). One way in which an agency's action can be
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enacted purposes canon confines the scope of the agency's powers. The
limitations it erects become particularly visible and significant in dynamic
times when the president and the existing statutory corpus reflect different
basic policies. That barrier is likely to be tested in a raft of cases challenging
the validity of deregulatory actions taken by agencies in the Trump
administration.
B. ENACTED PURPOSES, THlE U.S. CODE, AND STATUTORY CULTURE
One might think that the way in which statutory provisions appear in the
United States Code is so elemental that it would hardly merit discussion. But
how the Code includes purpose provisions obscures these provisions in several
important ways.
To appreciate how the Code does so, it is first important to recall what
the United States Code is and how it is populated with legislation. The Office
of Law Revision Counsel ("OLRC"), an office in the House of Representatives,
has statutory responsibility for preparing and updating the United States
Code.278 Thatjob has two main elements. The first is the job we imagine-the
Office takes newly passed public laws and fits in the titles of the U.S. Code.
Second, the OLRC also periodically assembles and reorganizes Code's titles,
and submits them to Congress for reenactment as a consolidated title. To
date, about half of the titles have been reenacted in this manner, and are
called "positive" titles, to contrast them with the remainder of the code, the
"nonpositive" titles.279 Positive titles, because they have been reenacted as such
in a public law, are authoritative sources, but the remainder of the Code, the
nonpositive titles, are merely prima facie evidence of the law.sso
In some cases, the task of placing new public laws in the U.S. Code is
straightforward. The Law Revision Counsel can simply drop the provisions of
the public law in a title of the Code, swapping the law's sections for new code
section numbers. But much new legislation amends various parts of the
existing corpus of federal legislation, and the organization of the new
arbitrary is by contravening statutory purposes. StateFarn 463 U.S. at 45. In State Farm, the classic
statement of arbitrariness review, the Supreme Court reversed an agency's decision to rescind the
rule requiring air bags or automatic seat belts in part because the rescission conflicted with the
basic purpose of the statute-promoting auto safety. See id. at 55-56; Merrick B. Garland,
Deregulation andjudicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 548-49 (1985) (showing how statutory
purpose intervened in hard look review in State Farm).
278. 2 U.S.C. § 281.
279. See generally OFFICE OF 'TiHE LAw REVISION COUNSEL: U.S. CODE, https://
uscode.house.gov/browse.xhtml [https://perma.cc/7QEN-UWE9] (listing the positive and
nonpositive titles).
280. See I U.S.C. § 204(a) (stating that nonpositive titles "establish prima facie the laws of the
United States," but providing that positive titles are "legal evidence of the laws"); see alsoU.S. Nat'l
Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993) (applying i U.S.C.
§ 204(a)); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964) (noting principle of I U.S.C § 204(a)
and commenting that change in arrangements in positive titles does not alter scope and purpose of
original enactment).
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legislation often does not neatly map the topical organization of the Code. As
a result, individual statutes often end up being codified in scattered provisions
of the Code.
When legislation includes an enacted statement of purpose, how are they
codified in the Code? The OLRC typically takes one of two approaches, both
with downsides. The first is to give the statute's purpose provision its own
Code sections, just like any other statutory provision. This has the advantage
of highlighting the purpose provision's existence within the Code.28, But it
has other effects as well. Because many statutes are codified in scattered or
separated provisions, purpose provisions are separated from the provisions
they accompanied when enacted. That disrupts the link between the purpose
provision and the statutory provisions to which it speaks.
Moreover, the mere fact of inclusion of public laws into a larger legal
corpus-the United States Code-diminishes the centrality of purpose
provisions. In a public law, the purpose provision leads and structures the
provisions that follow; it purports to speak to the entire statute. But once a
public law is placed in the Code, the enacted purpose provision appears as
part of this new legal entity, the Code, alongside many other Code provisions;
the Code clouds the connections between purpose provisions and the
statutory provisions with which they were enacted.
Frequently and even more worrisome, enacted purpose provisions do not
even make it into the text of the United States Code. Instead, the OLRC places
purpose statements in the Notes of the Code, which are reproduced under
the numbered Code sections in the place a footnote would appear.28 2 The
relegation of purpose provision to the Notes of the Code has no formal legal
effect. The text of the law in the Statutes-at-Large, not the text of the U.S.
Code, controls.283
281. Hundreds of purpose provisions are codified in sections of the United States Code.
Indeed, searching for "purposes" solely in the headings of sections in the Code yields over looo
results in the OLRC's electronic version of the Code. See OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL:
U.S. CODE, https://uscode.house.gov/search.xhtml?searchString=head%3A%28purposes%
29&pageNumber=2&itemsPerPage= ioo&sortField=CODEORDER&action=search&q=%7C%3
A% 3A% 3A%3 A%3A%3A%3A%gAfalse%3 A% 7 C%3 A% 3 A% 3A% 3A%3 A% 3A%3A% 3Afalse%
3A%7 Ctrue%7C%5 B% 3A%3 A% 3A%3 A% 3A% 3 A% 3A% 3Afalse%3A% 5D%7 C%5BSGVhZGlu
Zw% 3D% 3 D% 3AcHVycG9zZXM% 3D% 5D [https://perma.cc/8MAT-5889]. For a sampling of
purpose provisions in the text of the U.S. Code, see infra Appendix A (sampling of purpose
provisions that appear in provisions of the United States Code).
282. See infra Appendix B (providing a sampling of purpose provisions that appear in the
Notes of the United States Code). In some cases, as Shobe uncovers, finding provisions do not
even make it into the Notes of the Code. Shobe, supra note 21, at 693 (noting findings and sense
of Congress provisions that were not included in the U.S. Code).
283. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 448; Welden, 377 U.S. at 98 n.4; see also Crane, supra
note 2o, at 679 (noting same); OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, DETAILED GUIDE TO THE U.S.
CODE CONTENT AND FEATURES, https://uscode.house.gov/detailed.guide.xhtml#statutory
[https://perma.cc/F6XJ-KPJZ] ("A provision of a Federal statute is the law whether the provision
appears in the Code as section text or as a statutory note, and even when it does not appear in the
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These codification practices take place in a legal culture that frequently
treats the Code as a shorthand for the corpus of all federal legislation.14 Talk
of "whole code" canons invites the incorrect perception that the U.S. Code is
a comprehensive statement of the law in the tradition of a civil law code. In
this regard, our citation practices are telling. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of
Citation moved in 1926, the year of publication of the U.S. Code, from
requiring citation only to the public law, 85 to requiring citation to the public
law and U.S. Code, 86 to requiring citation only to the U.S. Code whenever a
citation is available.28 7 This shift carries a clear message about what the legal
community considers an authoritative source of federal legislation.
Neglect is likely to be particularly acute for purpose provisions relegated
to the Notes of the Code. In the official version of the Code, the Notes are
parsimonious, appearing as discrete additions following the text of the Code
provision. But today, few open hard-bound copies of the U.S. Code. The most
widely used legal research tools, Westlaw and Lexis, further confuse the place
of these official Notes. In Westlaw, the Notes of the Code appear under a tab
labeled "History" (which they are not), and then under the heading of
"Editor's and Revision Notes."288 Those Editor's and Revision Notes mix
Westlaw's own content with the official Notes in a way that makes it difficult
to distinguish. Lexis also places the official Notes under the tab heading of
"History" and reorganizes their content. These choices send the misleading
Code at all. The fact that a provision is set out as a note is merely the result of an editorial decision
and has no effect on its meaning or validity.").
284. See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 572 n.7 (20 2) (noting that
respondent could cite "no provision in the United States Code" bearing proposed meaning of
term); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 6o8 (2oto) (applying surplusage canon to "any two
provisions in the U.S. Code, even when Congress enacted the provisions at different times");
Abbe R. Gluck, Comments: Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era
of thunthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARv. L. REv. 62, 63, 85 (2015) ("Perhaps courts are best conceived
as guardians of the U.S. Code.... A Court that sees its proper role as 'keeper of the U.S. Code'
-in the sense of reading statutes to be perfectly coherent and consistent-is not a Court focused
on legislative supremacy.").
285. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 12 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et al. eds., Ist ed. 1926) (providing model citation to Stat. volume and page).
286. See TIE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 19 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1928) (requiring citation to Stat. by volume and page and then Code by title
and provision).
287. See THE BLJEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 2o (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et al. eds., 8th ed. 1949) (requiring citation to U.S. Code when available). There was some
fluctuation after 1949, but that is the citation rule today. See TIE BLUEBOOK A UNIFORM SYSTEM
OF CITATION R. 12, at 121 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015); Tobias A.
Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading Statutes, so GREEN BAG 2D 283, 288 n. 14 (2007) (noting
that Bluebook stopped requiring citation to Statutes at Large in 1949 in the Bluebook's 8th
edition in 1949).
288. A Westlaw search for any of the portions of the U.S. Code of Appendix B infra shows
that Westlaw reproduces the official Notes to the Code under its History tab but does not
separately designate the official Notes. Instead, they appear mixed with its other editorial content.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A § 504 (West 2019).
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impression that the official Code Notes are just a collection of miscellaneous
editorial notes or are merely of historical interest.89 Surprisingly few lawyers
andjudges-even those who deal with federal legislation-know that purpose
provisions are frequently relegated to the Notes of the U.S. Code.
The casual identification of our corpus of federal legislation with the
Code diminishes the intrinsic importance of purpose provisions. It suggests
that lawyers can resolve statutory issues based on the analysis of the Code, not
by integrating free-standing statutes. It invites lawyers to view placement in the
Code as significant.2o And it creates a pathway for overlooking purpose
provisions, either because they are relegated to Notes within the Code or
isolated from the operative provisions they address. Indeed, Shobe identifies
several cases in which the Supreme Court ignores relevant purpose
statements, including those that appeared in the Notes to the Code.29, No
doubt the set of court decisions, briefs, and client advice in which purpose
provisions are overlooked is vast.
Recognition of the enacted purposes canon reinforces that our federal
legislation requires statutory, not code, interpretation. And statutory
interpretation should begin by asking whether the statute includes an enacted
purpose.
C. CONGRESS AND STATUTORY DEsiGN
How would recognition of the enacted purposes canon influence
congressional drafting? In asking this question it is important to first
acknowledge that congressional staffers (and presumably members of
Congress) devote little attention to understanding specific principles of
statutory interpretation.292 Drafting statutes in light of judicial interpretive
289. To find the Notes to the Code presented in a clear fashion in an electronic source, one
needs to turn to U.S. government sources, see U.S. PUBLISHING Gov'T. OFFICE: U.S CODE,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode [https://perma.cc/HKD7-SAUA], or to
Cornell's Legal Information Institute, see CORNELL LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL INFO. INST.: U.S. CODE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text [https://perma.cc/32NA-T3 4 4]. Despite long
practice of publishing purpose provisions only in the Notes to the U.S. Code, the Bluebook did
not even include a cite form for U.S. Code Notes until the 20th edition. See THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 12, at 124 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015)-
290. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 227, at 1 12-13 (noting, critically, Justice Ginsburg's
treatment of placement in the Code as bearing on interpretation in Yates v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (plurality opinion)).
291. Shobe, supra note 21, at 697-99. Shobe provides an excellent illustration. In Federal
Aviation Administration v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012), the Court denied that "actual damages"
included mental or emotional distress, but "failed to mention the enacted findings and purposes
of the statute, which were codified in notes in the US Code." Shobe, supra note 21, at 698.
292. See generally Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 228 (documenting congressional
drafters' dim knowledge of many judicial canons).
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practices has not been at the top of congressional priorities.293 So there must
be moderate expectations about the extent to which greater judicial
recognition of any principle would alter congressional practice.
Yet for legislative drafters, inside and outside of Congress, who are paying
attention to judicial practice, recognition of the enacted purposes canon
should alter their approach. The current counsel in federal legislative
drafting manuals on purpose provisions is superficial. Some discourage
purpose provisions on the ground that the material is better stated in
committee reports,294 and others endorse them only when necessary to
eliminate ambiguity or to support constitutional requirements.295 This
counsel neglects the most salient feature of enacted purposes and their effect
on how the statute is implemented: the enacting coalition's interest in
entrenching a policy and making it more difficult for courts and agencies to
stray from it. The greater the interest and support for entrenching a policy or
set of policies, the more reason for the enacting coalition to include purpose
provisions, and relatively more specific ones.29
6 This logic goes right to the
heart of what the enacted purposes canon does; it limits interpretations to
those that do not thwart the enacted purposes, setting an overall trajectory for
the statute that is more difficult to change. At times, an enacting coalition will
want their statutes to constrain the courts' and presidential administrations'
flexibility. At times not. But it is that consideration that should be at the
forefront for legislative drafters seeking to serve their clients.297
293. For a useful account of pragmatic efforts to create more judicial-Congress dialogue,
including creating a pipeline for courts to notify Congress of glitches they find in statutes, see
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,JUDGING STATUTES 97-102 (2014)-
294. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAL
ON DRAFTING STYLE, lo4 th Cong. ist Sess., HLC-so4 , at 28 (1995) ("Discourage clients from
including findings and purposes. Both are matters that are more appropriately and safely dealt
with in the committee report than in the bill."); LAWRENCEE. FILSON & SANDRA L. STROKOFF, TIE
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE 127-28 (2d ed. 2oo8) (discouraging including a
statement of purpose in a bill and stating that purpose is better dealt with in committee reports).
295. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THlE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 285 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting that purpose provisions may be useful where there is "a pervasive uncertainty that cannot
be removed in the specific directions, authorizations, and prohibitions of the bill" but even then
that there are downsides); DONALD HIRSCH1, DRAFTING FEDERAL LAw 29 (2d ed. 1989) (noting
that findings and purpose statements "may be useful, in a bill founded on the commerce clause,"
but otherwise discouraging their use).
296. More specific purpose provisions are generally viewed as more useful. See G.C.
THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 155 (4 th ed. 1996) ("Greater specificity can reduce the level
of vagueness that depreciates the value of many purpose provisions."). A fruitful line of statistical
research would be to evaluate whether Congress includes enacted purposes more often in periods
of unified or divided government. The analysis here would suggest that they should appear more
often in unified government, where Congress and the President have fewer constraints on
entrenching legislative policy.
297. Separately from Congress's incentives to entrench policies through purpose provisions,
more research is needed on how the presence of a purpose provision influences the drafting
process. In the UK, it has been suggested that an early draft of the purpose provision improves
the drafting process by helping to ensure that the operative provisions are drafted "in light of the
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VII. CONCLUSION
When Congress includes an enacted statement of purpose, a court is
bound to accept the statement, just as it is bound to accept other parts of the
statutory text. This basic logic underlies the Supreme Court's long practice of
reliance on enacted purpose provisions to exclude interpretations
inconsistent with those purposes. Once that practice is reconstructed, it
becomes clear that reliance on enacted purposes to exclude interpretations
inconsistent with those purposes is already a bedrock principle of statutory
interpretation. Given this principle's long and frequent use and its strong
analytic and normative justifications, it warrants identification as a canon of
statutory interpretation. Explicit recognition of the enacted purposes canon
would alert Congress to the use of enacted purpose provisions as tools to
entrench policy. More generally, recognition of the canon would serve as
reminder to the bench and bar that the first step in statutory interpretation is
to ask whether the statute has an enacted purpose.
purpose clause rather than the other way around." Id. at 156. See generally Barnes, supra note 36,
at 24-25 (providing a concise summary of object clauses and their impact on drafting in
parliaments). Does the same hold in Congress? There are likely no general answers to whether
drafting in light of purpose exacerbates disagreements on higher-order issues or usefully anchors
deliberation, but case studies of legislative drafting could identify some useful dynamics to guide




The following is a sampling of purpose provisions codified in provisions
of the United States Code, in both positive and nonpositive titles.
PosIEVE TImES
5 U.S.C. § 561 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of iggo, Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 4969, 4969-7o);
5 U.S.C. § 6oi (2012) (codifying purpose provision in Federal
Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-221, § 2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 227, 227);
28 U.S.C. § ggi (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837,
2017-18);
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) (codifying findings and declaration of purpose
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 4(a), 90
Stat. 2891, 2892);
31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (codifying declaration of purpose provision for
portion of Banking Secrecy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 5311, 96 Stat.
877, 995);
31 U.S.C- § 5361 (2012) (codifying congressional findings and purpose
of Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No.1og-
347, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1952);
38 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Homeless
Veterans Comprehensive Assistance Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-95,
§ 5(a)(1), 115 Stat. 903, 905);
38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
353, § 2(a), io8 Stat. 3149, 3150);
44 U.S.C- § 3501 (2012) (codifying purposes set forth in Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 1og Stat. 163, 163-64);
44 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012) (codifying purposes set forth in Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, § 2(a),
128 Stat. 3073, 3073-74);
I1- 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012) (codifying purpose provision Hazardous
Materials Transportation Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ i (d), io8 Stat. 745, 759);
12. 51 U.S.C. § 20102 (2012) (codifying congressional findings and
purpose of National Aeronautics and Space Act, Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 3, 124
Stat. 3328, 3330-32 (2010)).
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2 U.S.C. § 661 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Federal Credit
Reform Act of iggo, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13201(a), 104 Stat. 1388,
16io-ii);
2 U.S.C. § 931 (2o2) (codifying purpose provision of Statutory Pay-As-
You-GoActof 201o, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 2,124 Stat. 8, 8);
7 U.S.C. § 5 (2o1) (codifying purpose provision of Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a) (5), 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-383);
7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012) (codifying "declaration of policy" of Food Stamp
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 2, 78 Stat. 703, 703);
7 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012) (codifying Congressional statement of purpose
of Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-463,
§ 2, go Stat. 1982, 1982);
8 U.S.C. § 1571 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Immigration
Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2ooo, Pub. L. No. 106-313,
§ 202, 114 Stat. 1251, 1262-63);
12 U.S.C. § 2281 (2012) (codifying Congressional findings and
declaration of purpose of Federal Financing Bank Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-224, § 2, 87 Stat. 937, 937);
12 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012) (codifying Congressional findings and
declaration of purpose of National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-351, § 2, 92 Stat. 499, 499 (1978));
15 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (codifying findings and purposes provisions of
Technology Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5111, 102 Stat.
1107, 1427-28 (1988));
15 U.S.C. § 6goa (2012) (codifying purpose provision of the Renewable
Fuel Capital Investment Pilot Program of the Energy Independence and
SecurityAct of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 1207, 121 Stat. 1492, 1775-76);
15 U.S.C. § 5502 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of High-
Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-194, § 3, L05 Stat.
1594, 1594-95);
19 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012) (codifying Congressional declaration of
purposes of Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-283,
§ 102, 79 Stat. 1016, 1016);
22 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (codifying purpose provision of Panama Canal
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-70, § 2, 93 Stat. 452, 455);
27 U.S.C. § 213 (2012) (codifying declaration of policy and purpose of
Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. ioo-690, § 8ooi (a) (3),
102 Stat- 4181, 4518);
29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (codifying Congressional declaration of findings,
purposes, and policy of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 2, 73 Stat. 519, 519);
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30 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012) (codifying Congressional findings and
declaration of purposes of National Critical Materials Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-373, § 202, 98 Stat. 1242, 1249-50);
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (codifying purposes set forth in Clean Air Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-2o6, § 1, 77 Stat. 392, 392-93)-
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APPENDIX B
The following is a sample of purpose provisions that appear in the notes
of the United States Code following codified provisions in both positive and
nonpositive titles:
PosITIvE TITLES
5 U.S.C. § 504 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose provisions
of portion of Equal Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202, 94 Stat.
2321, 2325 (1980));
5 U.S.C.A. § 5542 note (2012) (reproducing in the notes the purpose
provisions of Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-
277, § 2, 128 Stat. 2995, 2995);
18 U.S.C. § 31 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose provisions
of portion ofJoint Resolution making continuing appropriations for the fiscal
year 1985, and for other purposes, Aircraft Sabotage Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 2012, 98 Stat. 1837, 2187 (1984));
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purposes and
finding provision of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23);
18 U.S.C. § 891 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. go-
321, § 2o, 82 Stat. 146, 159 (1968));
18 U.S.C. § 921 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
308,§ i (b), 1oo Stat. 449, 449 (1986));
18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-291, § 2, 96 Stat. 1248, 1248-49);
23 U.S.C. § 6o note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Transportation Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1502, 112 Stat. 107, 241);
28 U.S.C. § 2671 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. oo-694, § 2, 102 Stat. 4563,
4563-64);
31 U.S.C. § 1101 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 2, 107 Stat. 285, 285);
49 U.S.C. § 26101 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-440, § 102, 1o8 Stat. 4615, 4615-16);
51 U.S.C. § 20102 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of National Aeronautics and Space Administration




7 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose provisions
of 2ooo amendments to Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 1(a) (5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2 763A-3 66);
LO U.S.C. § 441 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1102, 11 oStat. 2422, 2676);
7 U.S.C. § 2131 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198,
§§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat. 1354, 1645-50);
12 U.S.C. 1819 note (2012) (printing on notes the purposes provisions
of Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, §io, 103 Stat. 183, 187);
12 U.S.C. § 3904a note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Foreign Debt Reserving Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-240, § 402 (a), 103 Stat. 2492, 2501);
15 USC § 16 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose provisions
of portion of Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 221(a), 118 Stat. 661, 668);
15 U.S.C. § 45 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose provisions
of portion of Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408 (a),
(b), 87 Stat. 576, 591 (1973));
15 U.S.C. § 654 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provision of portion of Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, § 902, 112 Stat. 2681, 2707-08);
15 U.S.C. § 3701 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 2, 110 Stat. 775, 775);
15 U.S.C. § 6301 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
1o6-21o, § 2, 114 Stat. 321, 321-22 (2000));
21 U.S.C. § 353 1512 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-293, § 2, 102 Stat. 95, 95-96);
19 U.S.C. § 2102 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purposes
provision of the International Trade and Investment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 302, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000-01 (1984));
22 U.S.C. § 2377 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1 9 9 6, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 324, 1io Stat. 1214, 1255);
22 U.S.C. § 71o note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 9og-164, § 2, 1ig Stat- 3558, 3558-59);
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25 U.S.C. § 22o note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No.1o8-374 , § 2, i18 Stat. 1773, 1773-74);
26 U.S.C. § i note (2012) (reproducing in the notes the purposes
provision of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 3, 123 Stat. 115, 115-16);
34 U.S.C. § 10531 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-517, § 2, 114 Stat. 2407, 2407);
42 U.S.C. § 247(c) note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Migrant and Community Health Centers
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626, § 204(a), 92 Stat. 3551, 3582-83);
42 U.S.C. § 4011 note (2012) (reproducing in notes the purpose
provisions of portion of Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 2004 , Pub. L. No. 1o8-264, § 2, 118 Stat. 712, 712-13);
42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012) (reproducing the purpose provisions of
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071).
Lz
0 G,
